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Foreword 
This book has its origin in a broadly shared unease about the application of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights on biological material as they affect access to, and the use of biotechnology in agri-
culture and especially small farmer seed systems and crops.  These problems arise because of 
the unique properties of plant materials to be reproduced, hybridised and transformed, both as 
a result of natural processes and through human intervention.  This can lead to a quagmire of 
legal and civic prpblems that will harm the development and application of biotechnology as a 
useful technology in agricultural research. This study is concerned only with the transforma-
tion through biotechnology, and more specifically with IPR protection, of transgenic new char-
acteristics in crop varieties, generally referred to as Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) 
or, in crops, GM varieties.   We do not argue against the need to provide adequate and legally 
protected rewards to promote useful inventions in this area. However we question the "one-
system-fits-all" approach that appears to have been adopted by industrial countries.  This ap-
proach disregards important biological and social factors that are inherent to agriculture and 
food production. By highlighting such problems, especially evident in the agriculture of many 
developing countries, the report aims to provide a basis for debate on more appropriate sui 
generis (unique) forms of IPR that are tailored to the special nature of biological (planting) ma-
terials. It consciously refrains from aiming to provide solutions. Solutions depend on first 
properly understanding the problem. In our view the polarised nature of the controversy cur-
rently raging over biotechnology is obscuring an understanding of this key issue. The research 
that forms the basis of this book was financed by OXFAM - the Netherlands (formerly NO-
VIB). We gratefully acknowledge the flexibility afforded to us in executing this project. Their 
support does not necessarily imply specific endorsement of the content of this book. The pro-
ject was undertaken by the AGROMISA Foundation for Small Scale Agriculture, located in 
Wageningen, the Netherlands. The analysis is done from two different perspectives: (i) from 
the perspective of international and national law and (ii) from the perspective of agriculture, 
farmers and plant breeding. These two perspectives do not necessarily lead to a common view-
point and they are presented in a dialectical fashion.  
The legal perspective is provided by Mr. Jan Anne Vos, who is an expert on international 
agreements of the T.M.C. Asser Institute, an inter-university research institute on international 
law in the Hague.  The author Jaap J. Hardon is a former director of the Centre for Genetic Re-
sources (CGN) in the Netherlands, with a long-term career in developing country agriculture. 
First as a plant breeder. He was subsequently involved in research and policy issues and was 
member of the Netherlands' representation in the FAO International Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture and in the Consultative Group on International Agriculture 
Research (CGIAR). In these capacities, and as a trained geneticist, he has followed the devel-
opments in biotechnology in aid of food security closely and with great interest over the years.  
Initially it was envisaged that the project would start with analysis of the various international 
agreements and selected national legislation on IPR relevant to biological planting materials. 
Subsequently this analysis would be followed by a workshop with various stakeholders, in-
cluding farmers, representatives from private industry and the research community, IPR issuing 
authorities and civil society. As the study progressed this proved to be a bridge too far. The pri-
vate industries approached were reluctant to commit themselves to stating their position or 
even entering into dialogue. Equally, a number of Civil Society Organisations expressed diffi-
culties with our assumption that, in time, biotechnology might be accepted as a useful technol-
ogy. IPR issuing authorities, with some exceptions, just took a narrow legal view, based on 
what constitutes an invention regardless of the content matter and its effect on society. This, in 
a way, typifies the stalemate in the present international dialogue and a confrontation of these 
  Biotechnology, Patents and Farmer Seed Systems 4
divergent views in a workshop was considered unlikely to modify such positions at the present 
time.    
As a result, we decided to lower our ambitions. The present book is submitted as an attempt to 
analyse the problems, as we see them, that accrue from applying conventional IPR protection 
to biological planting materials that are important to farmers and food security, and to progress 
of this research in the general interest. A potential and valid criticism of this book is that it re-
frains from providing possible solutions. What we think is needed at this stage is that the vari-
ous stakeholders in this controversy recognise that there is indeed a problem that needs to be 
considered.  
We want to give special thanks to Mr Ab van Eldijk of the Agricultural University of Wagenin-
gen who shared with us his knowledge and understanding of the subject and the many people 
took the time to share their views and opinions with us. We would like to give special mention 
to the international NGO SEARICE who conducted farmer meetings and consulted national 
authorities in the Philippines. Their efforts, and especially those of Neth Dano and Elpido Ven 
Peria (Ping), were extremely helpful in understanding the concerns of farmers with regard to 
national policies. An important contribution was rendered by Dr.Bala Ravi, legal advisor to the 
M.S. Swaminathan Foundation in Madras (India) and former Assistant Director General (Intel-
lectual Property Rights) of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, who has been closely 
associated with the innovative Indian legislation on the subject.       
We want to acknowledge the very helpful assistance provided by Harry Oppenoorth of HIVOS, 
in facilitating the analysis provided by national legal experts on the IPR legislation in Uganda -
Arthur Mpeira, ACODE, Nicaragua - El Centro Alexander von Humbold, and El Salvador - 
CESTA. Special thanks are due to representatives of the various international organisations 
including the FAO - Jose Esquinas Alcazar, Alvaro Toledo Chavarri and Victor Mosoti, WTO - 
Mrs Jayashree Watal, UPOV - Dr. R. Joerdens and Dr. Makoto Tabata and WIPO - Mr. Shakeel 
Bhatti and Dr. R.Kjelgaard who provided us with important insights into the content of the 
various international agreements relevant to IPR. They gave their views in a personal capacity, 
which proved to be much more helpful than re-stating official policies and for which we are 
much indebted. The same applies to representatives of the Netherlands Biotech Industry Asso-
ciation - Dr. H. Raven, Dr. M.B.M. Bruins and Mrs. E.M.van Dijk - and Mr. K.A. Fikkert of 
the Netherlands Council for Plant Breaders Rights. Dr. Michael Halewood, legal expert at IP-
GRI (Rome), Niels Louwaars (PRI -Wageningen) and Dr.C. Noome struggled through an early 
draft and provided  many useful comments based on their intimate knowledge and understand-
ing of international developments in intellectual property protection in agriculture. We want to 
express our special gratitude to   personal contacts and colleagues in private industry , who in a 
personal capacity were willing to share their professional concerns and views on IPR as ap-
plied to planting materials with us. Special thanks are due to Dr. Janice Jiggins, Dr. Nicholas 
Parrott and mr. Edwin Nuijten who helped in critically reviewing and editing this document. 
They coped with a stylistic dialectical presentation with great understanding of the subject mat-
ter. Finally we want to acknowledge the help of Eva Kok of Agromisa who ably took care of 
the final editing and lay-out. 
The author hopes that this document will contribute to a more rational international debate on 
the use of biotechnology in the general interest and to a better understanding of how IPR fea-
tures in these developments.  
Jaap J. Hardon.  
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Summary 
This document covers: 
 
 An introduction to the practices of Farmer Seed Systems in Developing Countries and of 
traditional plant breeding.  
 Analysis of the introduction of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) regimes relating to 
biotechnology into International Agreements (such as WTO/TRIPS, the FAO Treaty on 
PGRFA, the CBD, WIPO and UPOV), International and National law.  
 Analysis of the conflicts that exist between the interpretation of IPRs over genetically 
modified plant resources and traditional farmers' and plant breeders practices relating to 
the ownership and distribution of planting material. 
 Assessment of the effects of IPRs in hindering biotechnological developments that would 
be of benefit to small farmers and contribute to improving food security.  
 
Biotechnology offers new options for crop improvement, which may potentially benefit agri-
culture and food security. However, its development, and introduction into agriculture, is riven 
with conflicts. These revolve around food safety and environmental issues as well as ethical 
concerns.  Entrenched and conflicting views about the benefits and drawbacks of biotechnol-
ogy are stifling dialogue about its potential, regulation and the structures required for equitably 
sharing the associated benefits and risks.  
 
Drawing on two disciplinary perspectives, a perspective from international and national law 
and a perspective from agriculture, farmers and plant breeding, this document highlights the 
problems and conflicts created by applying Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) to biological 
materials. Historically this has occurred because the promise of biotechnology has attracted a 
new group of players (multinational chemical and pharmaceutical companies) into plant breed-
ing, who have bought a different set of protocols with them. The traditional concept, shared by 
farmers and plant breeders, that genetic material is a common good to be shared for universal 
benefit, has been displaced by one that views biotechnologically engineered plant materials as 
a private resource.  
 
These companies, and their governments, have successfully lobbied organisations such as the 
WTO/TRIPS to extend the concept of IPRs to genetically modified plant resources. Their main 
justification is that such protection is needed to recoup the high levels of investment required 
for R&D.  Yet the extension of patent rights to genetic materials also implies unprecedented 
levels of market control over plant materials, with serious implications for the practices of tra-
ditional Farmer Seed Systems and traditional plant breeders and potentially lucrative profits for 
these companies shareholders.   
 
The report analyses the legal basis and interpretation of IPRs provided through various Interna-
tional Agreements, international law and, national legislation in a selection of developing 
countries. A number of scenarios are used to describe events that have taken, or may take, 
place when genetically modified and patent-protected materials (GM varieties) are introduced 
into farmers' fields. These findings are set against the perspectives of agriculture and, particu-
larly of those of small farmers. It is concluded that the various international agreements are 
sufficiently flexible to allow interpretations at the national level that are not necessarily incon-
sistent with the functioning of Farmer Seed Systems. However, such interpretations are subject 
to intense pressures through bilateral trade agreements and through the negotiations in the con-
text of the WTO.           
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This exercise shows how the application of IPRs to planting materials creates a number of 
problems:  
 It does not make biological sense to provide exclusive ownership rights in self-reproducing 
and hybridising living materials;  
 It conflicts with the evolutionary nature of crop improvement;  
 It conflicts with the practices and cosmo-vision of farmers and the functioning of Farmer 
Seed Systems, which form the basis of agriculture and food production in most developing 
countries.  
 It conflicts with ways in which plant breeding regimes and the exchange of genetic mate-
rial have operated for more than a century. In so doing it shifts access to, and control over, 
such resources from the public to the private domain.  
 
The report concludes that IPRs, which are intended to provide a balance between rights pro-
vided to an inventor and the interests of society itself, are skewed in favor of inventors and 
corporations. This imbalance has far reaching effects on the application of, and access to, bio-
technology and is one of the main factors hindering the acceptance and social usefulness of 
biotechnology. While it is indisputable that useful inventions in plant biotechnology (as in 
other research) should be rewarded and legally protected, this could be better achieved through 
a more appropriate sui generis solution, that also reflects the interests of society and food pro-
duction.
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1 Introduction
The present document is the outcome of the project Consequences of Intellectual Property 
Rights on biological materials as enforced by WTO/TRIPS on Farmer Seed Systems in Devel-
oping Countries carried out by the Agromisa Foundation in co-operation with the T.M.C. As-
ser Institute on International law. NOVIB  Oxfam Netherlands, funded the project. 
This study adopted a dialectical approach, building on the two different perspectives. These 
are, on the one hand, the perspective of Agromisa on small scale subsistence agriculture, and 
on the other, a legal perspective on the evolving international and national legislative frame-
work relating to the use and development of genetic resources in agriculture with an emphasis 
on biotechnology. A dialectical approach in presenting the results and views has been adopted 
since the problems raised in this area have no simple or singular solutions. 
Intellectual Property has become a contentious issue in agricultural crops with the birth of 
modern plant biotechnology. An early ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
Diamond v. Chakrabaty case in 1980 approved a patent for a genetically modified micro-
organism. This opened the floodgate to expand patent protection to other living materials and 
associated processes. It superseded a far more modest existing sui generis Plant Breeders 
Rights (PBR) legal protection. Plant Breeders Rights evolved since the nineteen thirties when 
crop improvement, formerly practised by farmers, became an applied form of genetics carried 
out by specialised institutions and commercial seed companies. This seed industry was initially 
firmly embedded in the agricultural sector, guided by the interests of farmers. The chemical 
and pharmaceutical industrial complex was well placed to play a major role in further devel-
opment of biotechnology and saw enormous potential for this technology in agriculture 
through genetic engineering. This industry demanded patents for a variety of biological prod-
ucts and processes resulting from biotechnological interventions and succeeded in extending 
the range of patentable subject matter in this direction. It was argued that biotechnology is 
similar in principle to other technologies, and that Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) should 
not discriminate against this new technology. These developments have had far reaching con-
sequences for plant breeding and access to new technologies for farmers. They have contrib-
uted significantly to a further shift of control over variety development from farmers and pub-
lic research to the private sector, in tandem with an already apparent world-wide trend of in-
creased privatisation of agricultural research. 
Intellectual Property Rights on GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms) and on technologies 
enabling the identification of useful genes and their transfer were considered by private indus-
try to be important, not only in capturing return on investment in research, but also in gaining 
access to agricultural markets. Pressure from industrial countries and an intense lobby of mul-
tinational corporations at negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) led to a special 
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights regimes (TRIPs). At the same time 
initiatives were taken to harmonise patent laws through the World Intellectual Property Organi-
sation (WIPO) in a one size fits all approach. Recognition of IPR protection was also in-
cluded in the texts of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the FAO Treaty on 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO Treaty). 
The TRIPs Agreement affords developing countries considerable flexibility in tailoring IPR 
regimes to their requirements in support of technological development. Article 7 of the 
WTO/TRIPS Agreement states that the objectives of the Agreement are: the protection and 
enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) contribute to the promotion of technological 
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innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of pro-
ducers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and eco-
nomic welfare, and to balance of rights and obligations. In addition the agreement provides 
for exceptions in granting rights in the general interest (Art. 30), including compulsory licenses 
(Art.31) under certain conditions. A key Article (27.3 (b)) allows countries to exclude plants 
and animals and essential biological processes from patentability. It provides the option of al-
ternative sui generis systems of IPR protection, including forms of PBR. In effect, this Article 
would seem to allow developing countries to tailor IPR regimes to their economic development 
and agricultural requirements in a manner akin to the historical, and evolutionary, development 
of IPR regimes in industrial countries. 
However, as an agreement TRIPS merely provides minimum standards which countries must 
adhere to as a condition of membership of the WTO. In addition to pressures exerted through 
WIPO, a concerted effort is being made through bilateral trade agreements, notably by the 
USA, to strengthen the level of patent protection in developing countries (Taylor et al, 2003). 
Essentially this means that developing countries are being denied the same conditions that, 
from the 1930s to the 1990s, allowed industrial countries to tailor IPR regimes to their national 
interests. This contradicts the stated objectives of the TRIPS agreement. 
The present book is concerned with the interests of small and often subsistence, farmers. Rec-
ognising the realities of a global economy that is ruled by powerful industrial interests, it 
seems likely that many developing countries may succumb to strong pressures to adopt IPR 
regimes that provide more or less exclusive ownership rights over GMOs and enabling tech-
nologies. 
Policymakers in the many developing countries where Farmer Seed Systems are the main 
source of seeds need to fully understand the consequences of such exclusive patent regimes 
when they are applied to GM crop varieties. Equally, the farming community needs to recog-
nise how such patent regimes will affect their access to protected GM varieties and how they 
might protect their interests. Representatives of developed countries at WIPO and the WTO 
should not just take account of their own industrial interests, but also take into consideration 
how strengthened IPR legislation affects agriculture, food security and the availability of tech-
nology to farmers who are operating outside the global economy. For the purpose of illustra-
tion and analysis, this study develops a number of scenarios that describe what might happen if 
IPR is adopted to cover GM varieties and if such varieties enter into Farmer Seed Systems. 
These scenarios are described in chapter 3. A primary concern is equity of rights and specifi-
cally the issues of enforcement and enforceability. 
An analysis was made of the various International Agreements, Conventions and Treaties 
(hereafter called agreements) pertaining to ownership issues as they effect farmers. These 
include the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and associated agreement on Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Regimes (TRIPs), the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) agreements, the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Treaty on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(TGRFA) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
Discussions were held with representatives of the Secretariats of these International agree-
ments. These representatives, with the exception of those of UPOV, stressed that their opinions 
were personal and should not be considered as official statements. However, we were im-
pressed and gratified by the apparent willingness shown in sharing their views with us in an 
open and critical manner. 
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In addition, in co-operation with national legal experts, we analysed national legislation passed 
in response to these Agreements in a few selected countries, including India, the Philippines, 
Brazil, Nicaragua, Uganda and Costa Rica. . 
In chapter 2 - Setting the Scene- we provide an overview of Farmer Seed Systems and issues 
related to concepts of ownership, access and use of plant materials, from the perspective of 
agriculture and small farmers. We also deal with the actual and potential contributions of plant 
breeding and biotechnology of relevance to farmers operating within Farmer Seed Systems. 
This is done in the present economic and legal context of research and agricultural develop-
ment. 
In chapter 3 a number of scenarios are described and developed to illustrate actual and 
potential biological and legal consequences of the introduction of varieties protected by 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in Farmer Seed Systems. 
Chapter 4 deals with IPR in the context of international law and the various international 
agreements and institutions relating to ownership, access and use of crop genetic resources and 
small Farmer Seed Systems. 
Chapter 5 provides a discussion of issues raised by the scenarios in the context of the various 
international Agreements and national laws in the selected countries. This is placed in the con-
text of the economic and political realities confronting the concepts and interests of Farmer 
Seed Systems and those of the Industrial and Institutional Seed Industry. 
Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks and recommendations. 
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2 Setting the scene 
2.1 Introduction 
The term Plant Genetic Resources (PGR) here refers to the total genetic diversity in crops 
and related wild species. They are an essential component of agriculture worldwide. For thou-
sands of years, since the dawn of agriculture, biological diversity and the PGR of crops were 
considered a gift of nature, a common heritage to be shared by all. When plants were being 
domesticated and evolved into crops, farmers realised the mutual inter-dependence with ge-
netic diversity as crops spread from their original centres of diversity and were introduced into 
new environments. The genetic diversity contained in these crops allowed adaptation to an 
ever-widening range of different environmental conditions and human requirements. 
Crop improvement takes place through an evolutionary process, with each generation of farm-
ers and breeders making use of the efforts of past generations in slow processes of change, 
providing food and other products for livelihood security. It was not claims of ownership over 
crop improvement that brought gains to farmers, but the sharing and unrestricted utilisation of 
results. Therefore, farmers worldwide and most others involved in agriculture have always 
considered genetic diversity as a common good. Good neighbourliness is an essential survival 
strategy of (poor) farming communities and has contributed to the incredibly rich diversity of 
crops. The exchange of good seed is considered to be a shared interest. It is a sobering thought 
that, in spite of enormous investments in plant breeding, agricultural research and lately bio-
technology, modern science has not created any genuinely new crops. Humanity is still totally 
dependent on what was inherited from the past efforts of farmers. 
From the Industrial Revolution onwards, and with an ever-growing momentum through the 
twentieth century, the common good principle associated with PGR has been eroded. In the 
process farmers have become increasingly pushed to the sideline. From autonomous develop-
ers and owners of their crops and harvested products farmers have increasingly become mere 
producers of agricultural commodities, integrated in industrial processes. An agricultural phi-
losophy of shared benefits and mutual inter-dependence has increasingly been replaced by an 
industrial philosophy dependent on a seed supply industry, motivated by market control and 
corporate profits. Modern developments surrounding PGR are guided less and less by the 
common good, and increasingly by the aim of securing private control. Ever-increasing yields 
go side by side with ever-increasing dependency. 
2.2 Seed Systems 
The universal interest of farmers is access to good planting materials, including seeds, tubers, 
roots and other vegetative parts used for the reproduction of appropriate varieties at affordable 
cost and available when required in the planting season. The term seed in this book is used to 
refer to all of these planting materials. 
Essentially two systems of seed supply can be 
recognised, which contrast in some basic princi-
ples of variety development and ownership and 
which have consequences for access and use. 
 A Farmer Seed System (FSS), existing since farmers started to domesticate crops and de-
velop locally adapted varieties (referred to as landraces or farmer varieties), in continuing 
processes of both human and natural selection. 
The primary interest of farmers and 
agriculture is access to good planting 
material 
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 An Institutional or Industrial Seed System (ISS), where the tasks of farmers in improving 
and developing varieties have been taken over by specialised institutions, both public and 
private, using modern science. Seeds of such varieties are largely sold to farmers through 
quasi-governmental or commercial companies. 
The FSS is part of what is generally referred to as traditional agriculture, while ISS is a com-
ponent of modern agriculture. These descriptions can be misleading however as both have a 
role to play in both traditional and modern agriculture settings. 
Traditional agricultural practices are relevant and appropriate to subsistence agriculture, to en-
vironments outside main market-oriented agricultural production areas and for minor crops of 
lesser economic importance. However, these crops typically are of major importance to local 
food security. 
Modern agriculture, on the other hand, is relevant for market-oriented agriculture in environ-
ments and crops that are large enough to justify investments in formal plant breeding. A basic 
requirement of modern agricultural practices is that farmers can afford to buy modern varieties 
and provide inputs (fertilisers, chemical plant protection, irrigation etc.) to realise the improved 
genetic yield potential over locally adapted landraces. It can be argued that the main advance 
achieved in formal plant breeding is better use of external inputs to utilise increased genetic 
yield potential. 
In most countries both systems operate side by side. In advanced industrial countries the com-
mercial sector dominates but allows farmers, to various degrees, to save part of the harvest of 
modern varieties for their own use in subsequent planting seasons. In most developing coun-
tries the FSS is the major source of seeds, and may utilise both landraces and, often, modern 
varieties. In developing countries modern varieties are primarily supplied by public institu-
tions, such as the International Future Harvest Institutes, funded internationally through the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). However, stimulated by 
globalisation, privatisation and economic development, the private seed industry is gradually 
becoming important in major commercial crops, even in developing countries. 
Of central importance to the present project is the fact that these seed systems have totally con-
trasting basic principles, notably where it concerns ownership of varieties and genetic materi-
als. 
2.3 Ownership 
The concept of ownership of planting material resulting from human interventions is central to 
the growing controversy that is the subject of this study. Analysis of the problems involved re-
quires an understanding of the dichotomy in basic principles and practices and the differences 
in rationale that exist between traditional and modern agriculture. 
Traditional agriculture 
Humanity began to change from hunting and gathering to growing plants and keeping animals 
for its livelihood some 10,000 years ago. In the process, crops evolved through domestication 
that markedly differ from their wild ancestors, better satisfying human requirements and 
adapted to agricultural practices in ever widening environmental conditions. There is convinc-
ing evidence that even the earliest farmers consciously selected their plant material, a practice 
that continuous today. As agriculture expanded from original centres of origin, crops were in-
troduced to new environments, encountered different a-biotic (soils, climate, temperature) and 
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biotic (pests and diseases) stresses and adapted to these. This adaptation has led to large num-
bers of local landraces of the various crops, both within and between regions and communities 
of farmers. A key characteristic of landraces is that genetic diversity is maintained, through 
natural processes and human intervention, which allows on farm selection and adaptation proc-
esses to continue, thereby establishing natural protection against pests and diseases and buffers 
against vagaries in the environment, both in time and in place. More than maximising yield, 
traditional agriculture aims at providing harvest security and sustainability of production over 
time. 
 
The central role played by genetic diversity 
within and between crops in traditional agricul-
ture is evident today. This genetic diversity has 
been developed and is largely maintained 
through use. Farmers grow their crops and apply a variety of practices, such as selecting seed 
after harvest for the next planting season. Seeds are a tool and not an objective in their own 
right. There is, by now, a wealth of documented evidence describing such practices, which dif-
fer in selection intensity, the division of labour and the often important role played by women, 
the major characteristics favoured and so on (for a review see Almekinders and de Boef, 2000). 
Landraces are often named on the basis of identifiable characteristics shared among communi-
ties. However, a common name may cover genetically diverse materials, due to independent 
selection by different farmers or even different genetic origins. As a rule, it can be said that 
farming communities share common gene pools (the total genetic diversity within shared ge-
netic materials) with considerable exchange between communities. Due to the proximity of 
fields planted to different landraces for a variety of reasons (adaptation, yield security, taste, 
cooking quality etc.), there is a continuous gene flow between landraces. This occurs through 
incidental hybridisation. The limited quantities of seed selected for future planting also leads to 
random divergence between farmers using named landraces (referred to as genetic drift). 
This is clearly a rather schematic overview of traditional agriculture and FSS and many excep-
tions can be cited. However the main purpose is to present some overall principles relevant to 
concepts of ownership. 
The previous paragraphs suggest that claiming ownership over the genetic content of specific 
planting materials is extremely difficult. However, this does not seem to be the main reason 
why in most traditional agriculture genetic materials are considered a common good. Through-
out the history of traditional agriculture farmers have benefited from free exchange, recognis-
ing their mutual interdependence in their constant search for better materials. This free ex-
change has become part of a common agricultural philosophy in the struggle of mainly subsis-
tence farmers for survival. It is an essential com-
ponent of traditional agriculture. 
Modern plant breeding has benefited enormously 
from this principle in its search for and collection 
of material in farmers fields for use in crop im-
provement programmes. Plant collectors from many industrial countries over the years ob-
tained large collections of landraces, either directly from farmers fields or donated willingly 
by farmers without asking for meaningful compensation. These collections are presently stored 
in numerous gene banks in both the public and the private sector. 
Modern agriculture 
What can be regarded as the elements of modern agriculture were introduced in Western 
Europe and North America in the Nineteenth Century. Technological developments in this era 
included chemical fertilisers, mechanisation, increased possibilities of irrigation and chemical 
Since the dawn of agriculture farmers 
selected in their planting material 
Throughout the history of agriculture farmers 
benefited from free exchange 
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control of pests and diseases. This coincided with a better understanding of genetics, which 
provided the basis for scientific plant breeding. These developments led to increasing possibili-
ties to control the diversity of environmental and other conditions affecting plant growth (soil 
fertility, water requirement, pests and diseases), adapting the environment to the requirements 
of specific crops and even to individual varieties. This represented the beginning of a dramatic 
change in agriculture. While previously crops and cropping systems were adapted to local and 
diverse environments, environments started to be adapted to the requirements of individual 
crops and even specific varieties; a process which 
continues today. 
In modern plant breeding the need to breed for ad-
aptation and yield security has been reduced, be-
cause it is possible to control external stresses. 
Breeding can now concentrate on maximising ge-
netic yield potential. The logical consequences of 
the trends in modern agriculture are monocultures of a limited number of uniform varieties 
maximising yield and produced by specialised institutional and/or commercial plant breeding 
and seed production systems. The self-sufficient, farmer-controlled and self-reproducing FSS 
has thus been gradually replaced by a more linear process. Farmers are supplied with new va-
rieties through a primarily private supply chain of plant breeding, seed production and distribu-
tion activities. 
It is relevant to note that in industrial countries the evolution from traditional to modern prac-
tices, and from the FSS into the ISS, proceeded gradually. In this process rules and regulations 
for commercial planting material were developed with a twofold objective: 
1 To protect the interests of farmers and to create a level playing field for competing seed 
companies. This led to Seed Legislation setting minimum standards for performance of mar-
keted varieties, to Seed Certification and to agreed seed quality standards (regarding vigour, 
purity etc.). 
2 To stimulate investment in private plant breeding. Plant Breeders Rights legislation was 
adopted (PBR) to protect the interests of plant breeders and to provide exclusive rights on 
the sale of protected varieties to recover the cost of research. Since 1961 PBR legislation in 
industrial countries has been harmonised in an International Convention (UPOV see Chapter 
4) with major revisions strengthening protection in 1978 and 1991. 
The Paris Convention of 1882, which formalised patents internationally, specifically excluded 
living materials. In the nineteen thirties, when legal ownership protection of new varieties by 
commercial companies became an issues, a conscious decision was made not to adopt the more 
stringent industrial patent protection. Important limitations of protection included a Farmers 
Privilege, allowing farmers to keep part of their harvest for the next years planting and in 
some countries allowing over the fence sale of seeds of protected varieties to neighbouring 
farmers. In addition there were no restrictions placed on the use of protected varieties by others 
for the breeding of new varieties. This was referred to as the Breeders Exemption. Hence 
modern varieties remained freely available as a genetic resource, in the age-old tradition of 
agriculture. However, as the commercial seed industry became incorporated in large multina-
tional companies, especially since the nineteen eighties, the industry has gradually demanded 
more stringent protection of new varieties, resulting in the 1991 revision of UPOV, which lim-
ited farmers privileges in producing their own seed. 
In modern agriculture, adaptation of crops to 
local environments is replaced by adapting 
the environment to crops and specific 
varieties 
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2.4 Biotechnology 
The development in molecular biology, generally referred to as biotechnology, has far reaching 
consequences for plant breeding by adding new tools for the improvement of crops. Scientifi-
cally it represents an ongoing advancement in the understanding of the biological complexities 
of genetic control in living organisms. 
Biotechnology refers to a range of research methods including, according to Persley et al, 
(1999): 
 Genomics: the molecular characterisation of species 
 Bioinformatics: the assembly of data from genomic analysis into accessible forms 
 Transformation: the introduction of one or more genes conferring potentially useful traits 
into micro-organisms, plants, livestock, fish and trees 
 Molecular breeding: the identification and evaluation of desirable traits in breeding pro-
grammes in living organisms by the use of marker assisted selection 
 Diagnostics: the use of molecular characterisation to provide more accurate and rapid 
identification of pathogens and other organisms 
 Vaccine technology: the use of modern immunology to develop recombinant DNA vac-
cines for improving control against diseases. 
The present study is only concerned with transformation, and more specifically with IPR pro-
tection of transgenic new characteristics in crop varieties, generally referred to as Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs) or, in crops, GM varieties. 
The development and use of GM varieties in agricultural crops is mired in conflicts. There is 
an ethical concern, that transformation crosses natural species barriers and thereby affects the 
existing natural order. There is a concern about the possible side effects of transferred gene-
complexes on the safety of foods. There is concern about the ecological effects of the introduc-
tion of GM varieties into the environment. Biotechnology has so far not yielded results that 
really convince consumers of its benefits, nor has it demonstrated an ability to contribute sig-
nificantly to food security. In consequence many people, as consumers and citizens, are resist-
ing a technology which they view as containing uncertain risks. 
Here we do not enter into the above debate, however valid or important. For the scenarios that 
are tested in this book, the assumption is that new varieties may be developed by means of bio-
technology and that these could provide real benefits in terms of food security, and to farmers 
and consumers without negative effects to the environment. Furthermore it is assumed that, 
over time, appropriate research into risk-analysis and meaningful control over various GM ap-
plications is possible and would lead to satisfactory results. However, the battle over these is-
sues is far from finished. The struggle originating from a technology driven by an industry 
primarily concerned with immediate corporate profits threatens not only advancement in bio-
technology research but also the trust of society in science and the motives of the scientists 
concerned. The argument used by industry, seemingly supported by the US government, that 
no evidence of risk is evidence of no risk is clearly insufficient to satisfy a majority of the 
industrys opponents 
The conflicts over the introduction of GM crops are therefore based largely on bio-safety con-
siderations, the safety of GM food products and of GM crops on the environment. While this 
falls outside the scope of this study, some observations may be made. Different approaches to 
bio-safety laws and regulations are becoming apparent, notably between the European Union 
(EU) and the US. These find expression in programmes aimed at assisting developing countries 
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in bio-safety capacity building. A US programme announced in 2003, funded by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), takes as its premise that GM crops are safe 
unless proven otherwise. A German financed assistance programme, on the other hand, is 
based on the assumption that GM crops must be proven safe for human health and the envi-
ronment before they can be commercialised. It should be noted that the US has so far not rati-
fied the UN Carthagena Protocol on Bio-safety. Hence, developing countries, lacking in exper-
tise in biotechnology and its many implications, are under pressure to implement bio-safety 
programmes for this new technology based on fundamentally conflicting approaches by indus-
trial countries. 
This study centres on the problems raised by applying industrial patent regimes to self-
replicating planting materials (crop varieties), and more specifically when such materials are 
introduced into agricultural systems whose planting materials are generated by common-good 
principles for plant genetic resources. 
2.5 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Why patents in planting materials? 
In the famous 1980-ruling of the Supreme Court of the US in the Diamond v. Chakrabaty case 
(referred to earlier) a patent was approved for a genetically modified micro-organism. 
The chemical/pharmaceutical complex, which dominates biotechnology, demanded and suc-
ceeded in extending patentable subject matter to cover a variety of biological products and 
processes resulting from biotechnological interventions. They argued that biotechnology is in 
principle similar to other technologies and that IPR should not discriminate against this new 
technology. 
Patents are a right conferred by society to an inventor. Society has an interest in stimulating 
innovation and does so by providing exclusive rights to the economic exploitation of a pat-
ented invention. Another way of looking at patents is to see them as a contract between society 
and the inventor. A common situation in contractual arrangements is that the separate interests 
of contracting parties have to be satisfied before a 
contract is entered into. 
The rationale for subsequently extending the patent 
system from micro-organisms to plants and animals 
was the development of genetic engineering and 
related techniques, which allowed the transfer of 
genes across natural species barriers in living organisms, including plants and animals. Like in 
the USA, many patent offices in developed countries decided that biotechnology did indeed 
introduce new techniques that met criteria for patentable inventions, unlike the common tech-
niques used in conventional plant breeding. In addition it was felt that biotechnology involved 
higher costs of research and development justifying higher levels of IPR protection than PBR, 
that would assist in the recovery of these higher costs. This would seem to be a reasonable ar-
gument. 
Problems with patents in plants 
Some important aspects would appear to have been conveniently overlooked in the decision to 
extend patent protection to biological materials. The decision assumes that there is no differ-
ence between biological material and non-living matter as a subject for invention, nor does it 
take account of differences in the use of such inventions. 
Patents are not an inherent right, but 
conditional rights conferred by society on the 
inventor 
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According to common interpretation, a patent is a right granted by a government to inventors 
to exclude others from imitating, manufacturing, using or selling a patented process or product 
for commercial use for a period of usually 17-20 years. In return for a patent the inventor dis-
closes how the invention works so that the knowledge is available to the public. To obtain a 
patent, the subject matter has to be novel and inventive, i.e. not obvious to a person skilled in 
the art. Patent law contains a provision known as research exemption: which allows others 
the right to study the protected subject matter, but not to commercially benefit from it. The ex-
tent of this research exemption is however subject to interpretation. For instance, in the US this 
exemption does not exist on statute and is interpreted extremely narrowly i.e. for philosophical 
or private purposes only. Hence, unlike PBR, reproducing or multiplying the patented material 
in any form is not permitted. 
However, the attempt to restrict the use of patented biological products or processes is fraught 
with problems as patented biological products have an inherent natural ability for reproduction 
and hybridisation with material that does not contain the patented subject. Natural cross-
pollination between crops in neighbouring fields often goes undetected. Thus, the transfer of 
the patented subject is virtually impossible to avoid, especially under conditions found in 
Farmer Seed Systems. 
Secondly, restrictions on the use of the patented 
subject matter do not take account of the evolu-
tionary nature of plant breeding. It ignores rele-
vant national and public interests, such as food 
security and the health of rural communities, no-
tably in more marginal environments. Common PBR legislation recognises that a new variety 
is usually based on past achievements in variety improvement. In order to benefit society at 
large such improvements need to be bred into other varieties that are adapted to the diverse 
environments in which the crop is grown. The assumption of one variety fits all environments 
does not make biological sense. Enforcing exclusive access to patented improvements restricts 
their use to single varieties, typically often only bred for high potential environments and prof-
itable markets. Hence improvements leave out characteristics that may benefit less commer-
cially developed farmers and regions. 
A further consideration, also linked to the com-
plex and step-wise process of plant breeding and 
the nature of biological material, is that im-
provements through the techniques of biotech-
nology often not depend on a single patented 
technology, but require access to a number of 
them. If such patents are held by different IPR holders, as is often the case, obtaining licenses 
for their use involves complicated negotiations and the need for a strong bargaining position. 
This puts small companies and the government institutions that are mainly responsible for ag-
ricultural research for small farmers, at a disadvantage. This conflicts with the objectives of 
patents, stated in Article 7 (objectives) of the TRIPS agreement. This affirms that: the protec-
tion and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of tech-
nological innovations and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual ad-
vantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to so-
cial and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
Private industry sources argue that the need to gain access to patented technologies held by 
different patent holders is a common requirement for companies that want to produce new 
products for different markets. A standard example put forth is the production of radios involv-
ing numerous patented technologies. However, the difference here is, that it may exclude indi-
Legal ownership of (biological) entities the 
spread of which through natural processes 
can not be contained creates a legal quagmire 
Restriction in he use of patented subject 
matter in plant breeding conflicts with its 
evolutionary nature and limits use of 
biotechnology in the interest of food security 
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vidual industries from producing certain products, but does not exclude users from access to 
such products. A radio works wherever it is used. In biotechnology, restricted access and use of 
technologies exclude access for use in crops and varieties for the poor and negatively impacts 
on food security. 
 
The proliferation of patent holders is proving to be a 
serious problem in biotechnological research and 
access to its results for the common good. Expecta-
tions that biotechnology would revolutionise crop 
improvement motivated a number of pharmaceuti-
cal/ chemical corporations that hold leading positions in biotechnological research, to establish 
a dominant position in plant breeding by buying-up seed companies on a global scale. They 
viewed food production as an interesting new market. The merging of agricultural chemicals, 
plant breeding and pharmaceutical industries into what is commonly referred to as the Life 
Sciences Industry was facilitated further by a trend over the past twenty years towards the 
privatisation of previously public research in plant breeding and agriculture. The need for uni-
versities and public research institutes to supplement their finances with external sources of 
funding reinforced this trend. Much research, even if carried out in the public domain, is now 
at least partially funded by private seed companies, and is often subject to various forms of 
IPRs and commercial agreements. The result is that restrictions are imposed on universities 
regarding the way in which they may distribute such materials. Patents have become important 
pawns in the competition for control over agricultural and food markets. It is reasonable to 
conclude that the opening of the possibility of obtaining exclusive patent rights in biotechnol-
ogy has contributed to a seed industry that is now dominated by a few huge international, in-
dustrial conglomerates that only serve commercially profitable markets. In applying patent 
protection to planting materials, patent issuing authorities do not seem to have considered how 
such patents affect a broad range of producers and users. It compromises the social and eco-
nomic systems of small farmers and farming communities and their contributions to national 
food security in many developing countries. 
Objectives of the present study 
The present study was carried out to highlight the problems that accrue from introducing patent 
protected plant materials (varieties of crops) into Farmer Seed Systems that are based on free 
exchange and mutual inter-dependence. It questions: 
 How patent protection on planting materials and enabling technologies affects the transfer 
and dissemination of technology 
 Whether this is to the mutual advantage of producers and users. 
 Whether such patenting is conducive to social and economic welfare. 
 How they effect access, use and conservation of agrobiodiversity 
The US, and to a lesser extent the EU actively promote agricultural biotechnology and support 
a strong patent protection for gene traits, tools for transformation and genetically improved 
varieties (see Taylor and Cayford, 2003). In addition, through WTO/TRIPS and WIPO, pres-
sures are exerted to obtain worldwide recognition of such patents, with little concern for the 
social outcomes or how society can obtain maximum benefit from such innovations. The main 
beneficiaries so far seem to be large corporations that have little economic incentive to develop 
and disseminate the technology to meet the needs of overall food security and the interests of 
small farmers in developing countries. How are the interests of millions of small farmers repre-
sented? How are the requirements for seed of small farmers, as major producers of food and 
seeds in developing countries, considered? What is the impact on the role of small farmers as 
creators and custodians of agrobiodiversity? What role do these considerations play in various 
Patents have become important pawns in 
competition for control over agricultural and 
food markets 
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international agreements? To what extent do these international agreements allow nation-states 
to tailor their IPR legislation to take account of these farmers and their particular needs? These 
were the questions that motivated this project and the writing of this report. They are devel-
oped in a number of scenarios described in chapter 3. 
These questions were (partially) answered by analysing various international agreements rele-
vant to conservation and use of biological diversity in Chapter 4. These include the FAO Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO Treaty), the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity (CBD), the WTO/TRIPS agreement, the World Property Organisation 
(WIPO) agreement and the International Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV). 
These analyses were followed-up by discussions with representatives of the secretariats of the 
various agreements. In addition, national IPR legislation enforced by WTO/TRIPS, passed by a 
number of selected developing countries - India, the Philippines, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica 
and Uganda -were reviewed with the assistance of national experts in those countries. 
The scenarios, developed to illustrate what may happen when IPR protected materials enter 
farmers fields, are described and analysed in chapter 5, from both the legal and the farmers 
perspective. This illustrates the legal, social, technical and economic problems that will sur-
face. 
It should be stated emphatically that no argument is made about the need to stimulate useful 
inventions by providing appropriate rewards. Also no position is taken on the (potential) sig-
nificance of biotechnology in crop improvement. 
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3 Scenarios on introduction of IPR protected 
varieties into farmer seed systems 
3.1 Project Rationale 
This chapter analyses the possible consequences of the recognition of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) on crop genetic material for Farmer Seed Systems. 
Given the important role of Farmer Seed Systems in the agriculture of most developing coun-
tries, the consequences of the recognition of IPRs on genetic material in conventional interna-
tional law needs to be analysed and fully understood. 
In consultation with, and legal support from, the T.M.C. Asser Institute, a Dutch inter-
university research institute on international law, Agromisa identified a number of questions 
regarding the normative situation of small farmers and local communities vis-à-vis IPRs on 
genetic materials. In order to present these questions in a realistic context, scenarios were de-
veloped to cover actual and potential situations that might arise if genetic material protected by 
IPRs enter into Farmer Seed Systems. These questions and scenarios are described in this 
chapter. The objective is to consider and illustrate how IPRs on genetic material might, or 
might not, be compatible with Farmer Seed Systems. A central problem underlying the various 
scenarios is that the reproduction and spread of genetic material protected by IPRs and its in-
corporation into other genetic materials, is affected by natural processes, which cannot be con-
tained in the context of the agricultural practices and socio-economic conditions of Farmer 
Seed Systems. This basic feature of genetic material is highly relevant in the consideration of 
the normative situation of local/traditional farmers vis-à-vis IPRs on genetic material. It seems 
to constitute an inherent conflict between the concept of an IPR, which relates to a particular 
characteristic or gene and therefore isolates such a gene or characteristic from other genetic 
material, and the natural processes through which genetic material combines and reproduces. 
3.2 General considerations 
1 An IPR is issued on the basis of national legislation. To what extent does the granting of 
such an exclusive right take into account other relevant public interests, such as sustainable 
agriculture, food security, environment, or health? 
2 If an IPR is granted on a gene or genetic characteristic in State A, but State B does not rec-
ognise that IPR, how should such a situation be considered from the perspective of (conven-
tional) international law? In asking this question we need to pay particular attention to: 
 The TRIPS Agreement 
 The Convention on Biological Diversity 
 The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
 The UPOV Convention 
 Relevant WIPO Conventions 
These International Agreements all affect, in one way or another, the conservation, use and ac-
cess of the genetic resources used in agriculture. However, they start from different objectives 
and were largely negotiated in different international fora and separately interpreted within 
their own context. The following scenarios are used to analyse the extent to which these 
Agreements take account of the fundamentals of Farmer Seed Systems and what the actual or 
potential consequences are or might be. Final responsibility for interpreting international law 
rests with national governments. These scenarios are meant to aid policy makers to arrive at an 
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interpretation that is compatible with the requirements of their agricultural sector. In addition, 
the scenarios may clarify what is at stake for farmers and how they need to protect their spe-
cific interests. 
3.3 Scenarios 
Scenario 1: Access to, and use of, modern varieties by small farmers 
Farmers can obtain seed of an IPR protected variety in different ways. They may obtain such 
seeds under specific contractual arrangements. It is also possible that they obtain seed material 
(unknowingly) contaminated with an IPR protected variety or trait (for instance in food aid 
shipments - Box 3.1, or contaminated non-GM seed  Box 3.2.). When other farmers in this, or 
neighbouring communities, wish to try the variety, the farmers who acquired the seed will give 
it to them in accordance with the social practices of traditional farming. Through such farmer-
to-farmer exchange the modern variety can spread rapidly, similar to the processes of diffusion 
following the release of Green Revolution varieties by the CGIAR Centres. Without such 
farmer-to-farmer exchange, the Green Revolution would not have had the rapid impact that it 
did in increasing national food production in many developing countries in the 1970s and 
1980s. However, the holder of the IPR will consider this practice to form an infringement of 
the IPR. Boxes 3.1 and 3.2 provide reported examples of how this has already happened. 
Box 3- 1 
 
Accidental distribution of GMO seed 
It is reported that farmers in some Angolan provinces are growing genetically modified (GM) seeds that en-
tered the country through food aid shipments. Elizabeth Matos, coordinator of Angolas National Centre of 
Phyto-Genetic Resources, said that the farmers did so because of a lack of available seeds for this years 
planting season. Matos warned that GM plants could contaminate and alter local crop varieties and said 
that the Angolan Government should stop allowing GM products to enter the country. 




Distribution through Farmer Seed Systems 
Monsanto Co. has stopped selling genetically modified (GM) soybean seeds in Argentina because it is un-
able to make a profit on their sale. The company says that widespread farmer-to-farmer seed exchange, 
which it refers to as a huge black market for seeds has made it impossible to recoup its investment. 
http://www.agbios.com/main.php?action=ShowNewsItem&id=5178 
 
If the IPR holder wishes to enforce his rights, this is likely to involve identifying the farmers 
growing the new variety in its original form and instigating legal procedures against them. This 
will raise a number of problems including: 
 Identifying where the new variety is grown will require visiting numerous fields of small 
farmers in possibly remote areas. 
 Small farmers may be growing the new variety in mixed stands with their traditional varie-
ties. 
 Non-existence of extension services in many areas, or their lack of co-operation, will com-
plicate identification of farmers growing the new variety. 
 National courts may be reluctant to deal with proceedings against large numbers of small 
subsistence farmers, in order to avoid social and political problems. 
 The enforcement of the IPR may create a public relations problem for the holder of the 
IPR. 
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 Whether or not the farmer knew, or ought to have known, that his planting material con-
tained a protected GM trait (i.e. the state of farmers knowledge). 
Commentary 
IPRs on self-reproducing biological material seem difficult to enforce under conditions of 
Farmer Seed Systems. Adopting legislation that either cannot be enforced or is detrimental to a 
system that forms the basis of agriculture in most developing countries would seem undesir-
able. On the other hand, without IPR protection, potentially valuable new varieties might not 
become accessible to small subsistence farmers, adversely affecting food security. 
Legal questions 
Consideration of the above raises the following legal questions: 
1 In the context of the TRIPS Agreement and national legislation, what workable options can 
be identified that enable small farmers to have access to new protected varieties in a manner 
that is compatible with Farmer Seed Systems, which are an important source of genetic di-
versity for modern plant breeding? 
2 In the context of the TRIPS Agreement and national legislation, what workable options can 
be identified that enable IPR holders to protect their rights when a variety is used in Farmer 
Seed Systems? 
3 If a farmer mixes a protected variety into a landrace and exchanges this mixture with a 
neighbour, does this constitute an infringement of the PBR? Is it relevant whether the pro-
tected variety constitutes 10%, 49%, 51% or 90% of the mixture? Does it make a difference 
whether the farmer knew, or did not know that the variety mixed into his landrace contained 
IPR protected material? 
4 If a farmer transfers the seed of a landrace containing an IPR-protected characteristic to a 
neighbour who produces for non-commercial purposes, does this constitute an infringement 
of the IPR or PBR? Is it relevant whether the seed is exchanged through barter (1 to 1), bar-
ter of planting material (1 to 2 or more), or sold? 
Scenario 2: Gene-flow in traditional agriculture 
A modern GM variety (for instance of maize) is purchased in small amounts by a number of 
small farmers. This maize variety is grown in small plots adjacent to plots grown with local 
landraces. The modern variety hybridises through natural pollination with local landraces. 
Farmers harvesting those local landraces observe increased variability and select to maintain 
the quality of the local landraces, and possibly increase yield potential through the newly in-
troduced genes from the modern variety. This is a normal procedure in Farmer Seed Systems. 
If the purchased variety also contains a gene covered by an IPR, this is likely to have become 
incorporated in the local landraces (see Box 3.3). 
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Box 3- 3 
 
GM Corn Spreading in Mexico 
A new study sponsored by a coalition of indigenous and farmers groups (2003) has found that contamina-
tion of Mexican maize crops by GM maize is more widespread than previously reported. Working with bi-
ologists from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the coalition used commercially available GM 
test kits on some 2000 crop plants from 138 farming and indigenous communities. Transgenes were identi-
fied in native corn from 33 communities, in nine Mexican states. The transgenes all originated from GM 
maize varieties patented by international biotechnology companies. Silva Ribeiro of the environmental or-
ganisation ETC Group says that GM contamination is probably the result of farmers planting some of the 
five to six tons of maize that enter Mexico each year from the US. The imported maize, some of which is 
brought in as food aid, is intended for consumption, but as Ribeiro explained drought in some areas of the 
country has caused farmers who dont have any of their own seed left to use the US corn, in spite of the 
government ban on GM cultivation. 
http://soyatech.com/bluebook/news/viewarticle.Idm?a=20031016-7 
 
This raises a number of problems including: 
 It is difficult and costly to trace introgressed, IPR-protected, characters in genetically vari-
able planting material grown by numerous small farmers. 
 The occurrence of genes protected by IPRs within farmer varieties may vary, from occa-
sional to frequent, depending on both natural and farmer selection. 
Commentary 
Once new varieties are grown in farmers fields, it is impossible to contain their genetic 
identity because of processes of natural introgression. If a right is granted on characteristics, of 
which the spread cannot be controlled, this would seem to affect the rights of farmers over the 
use of contaminated local landraces. 
Legal questions 
This scenario raises a number of questions: 
1 How is the question of the relation between IPRs and the process of natural introgression 
considered in the TRIPS Agreement? 
2 Can the holder of an IPR on a gene be held liable for not containing this gene, especially if it 
has detrimental side effects on local landraces? 
Scenario 3: Gene-bank Collections 
A collector for a gene bank collects local landraces. These are entered into the gene bank and 
later released to a plant breeder who uses the material as one of the parents in a conventional 
breeding programme. After the usual 8-12 rounds of selection the plant breeder releases a final 
variety. It then appears that (through previous natural introgression) it incorporates a character 
or gene protected by an IPR, which was linked to another characteristic or gene that the plant 
breeder had selected for. The holder of the IPR might adopt the position that the final variety 
infringes their IPR on the characteristic or gene. The plant breeder might respond that the 
breeding material was obtained from a gene bank and that he or she did not have had any 
knowledge of the gene or the IPR. While there are no reported examples yet of such events, 
similar events could occur in other ways, including mistaken identity of seed samples distrib-
uted by gene banks (Box 3- 4). 
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Box 3-4 
 
Accidental distribution of GMO seed 
Researchers at the University of California (Davis), say that they have accidentally shipped genetically 
modified (GM) tomato seeds to researchers around the world over the past seven years. These seeds, 
originally donated by a seed company, were misidentified as belonging to a non-GM line and distributed to 
researchers in 14 countries and to demonstration gardens in the UK and Ethiopia, two countries where the 
product was not approved. Michelle Marvier, assistant-professor of biology at Santa Clara University stated 
Its disturbing, but fits into a pattern. This kind of thing is going to happen over and over again, no matter 
how careful we try to be, and next time it might be something not so benign. Joe Mendelson, legal director 
at the Centre for Food Safety in Washington DC , agreed. There is a setting for those mix-ups to happen. 
http://www.agbios.com/main.php?action=ShowNewsItem&id=5107 
 
This raises a number of questions: 
 A gene bank generally does not have the facilities to screen collected materials for individ-
ual characteristics, and therefore cannot guarantee their genetic properties. 
 A requirement on the part of the plant breeder to screen breeding material for the possible 
inclusion of genes protected by IPRs, would seem to be burdensome and contravene the 
purpose of the gene bank system. 
Commentary 
Under the conditions of a Farmer Seed System, the holder of an IPR cannot control dispersal of 
a gene protected by the IPR through natural introgression. Furthermore, under the present state 
of knowledge, a plant breeder or the owner of the IPR, cannot selectively remove a gene pro-
tected by an IPR from a newly bred variety, except by a lengthy and costly process of repeated 
backcrossing. 
Legal questions 
The questions considered above raise a number of legal questions: 
1 Is a gene bank responsible for the material it distributes? Would a gene bank be infringing an 
IPR if, without prior knowledge, it distributed material that contains a patented gene? 
2 Can the owner of an IPR on a gene claim legal rights over a newly bred variety, if both the 
gene bank and the plant breeder acted in good faith and could not be expected to have prior 
knowledge of the occurrence of that gene in the breeding material? 
3 Can the plant breeder of a newly bred variety claim compensation from the holder of the IPR 
for not containing the gene or for contaminating the breeding material? 
The Genetic Resources Policy Committee of the CGIAR will address these issues in a meeting 
in August of 2004 to provide guidance to gene banks. 
Scenario 4: Essential derivation 
According to Article 14(5) of UPOV (1991), a breeders right does not apply to a variety that is 
essentially derived from a protected variety. If a breeder changes a variety minimally through 
e.g. the selection of a mutant after repeated backcrossing, the new variety, assuming it satisfies 
the PBR requirements for Distinctiveness, Uniformity and Stability (D.U.S.) can get PBR pro-
tection. However, according to Article 14(5) of UPOV (1991), the breeder of the original vari-
ety can claim rights over such an essentially derived variety. This means that the breeder of 
the variety has to enter into an agreement with the holder of the rights of the initial variety in 
order to commercialise his, essentially derived, variety. On the other hand, essential derivation 
is a common and accepted feature in Farmer Seed Systems. 
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Legal question 
1 If a breeder uses a local landrace that is more or less uniform, identifies a mutant and applies 
for a PBR, can the owner (a farmer or community) from whom the local landrace was ob-
tained oppose the PBR on the basis of the concept of essential derivation? 
Scenario 5: Inventions of general interest 
Through research in the commercial sector a new genetic system is developed and protected by 
an IPR. For instance a gene is isolated that provides a new form of resistance against pests or 
diseases. With regard to food security, it seems to be in the interest of society as a whole that 
this new characteristic is incorporated into as many varieties as possible, including farmer-bred 
landraces in different environments. However, such wider societal interest seems incompatible 
with the exclusivity of the IPR. The same applies to IPR protected technologies needed for de-
veloping GM varieties in crops, or for environments, not covered by the patent holder. This 
applies specifically to numerous smaller crops of lesser economic importance. Fragmentation 
of IPRs in multiple private and public institutions is identified as an important barrier to the 
biotechnology being applied in the general interest. The general nature of this problem is illus-
trated in Box 3-5. 
Box 3-5 
 
Concern about access to patented technology 
Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management. 
A group of scientists of major universities in the US led by the president of the University of California (R.C. 
Atkinson) note that through biotechnology and increased IP protection of agricultural inventions, agricul-
tural research in major crops and enabling technologies is shifting from the public sector to the private sec-
tor. This leaves responsibility for research in smaller crops, including subsistence crops important to devel-
oping countries, mostly in the hands of the public sector. While many significant discoveries and technolo-
gies are still generated by public research, privatisation and reduced public spending in research fre-
quently leads to licensing such discoveries on an exclusive basis to private industry. Fragmentation of IPR 
in the hands of multiple private and public institutions is identified as an important barrier to the application 
of biotechnology in the public interest and agriculture, notably in developing countries. The group, referred 
to as the Public-Sector Intellectual Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA) stops short of challenging the appro-
priateness of patenting biological materials, but intends to explore options for broadening access to IP pro-
tected inventions in agriculture and IP management by public institutions in the general interest. 
Science, vol. 301, 11 July 2003 
http://www.pipra.org 
 
This raises the following question. National authorities grant IPRs to an inventor. Are there 
options for such national authorities to limit IPRs in order to ensure the rapid incorporation of 
the genetic system in other varieties, including farmer-bred varieties, while providing a reason-
able and appropriate financial reward to the holder of the IPR? 
Commentary 
PBR includes the possibility of issuing licenses for the production of seed of PBR-protected 
varieties by third parties, if the holder of the PBR fails to provide an adequate supply of seed to 
cover demand. In the case quoted here, by seeking to limit the new characteristic to their own 
variety, adapted only to particular (often high potential) environments, the patent holder does 
not seem to be adequately satisfying demand. 
Common patent systems also include a compulsory licensing clause. The key question is how 
easily this clause can be applied. Most companies strongly oppose application of this clause for 
the obvious reason that this reduces their exclusive use and control. 
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Legal questions 
1 Are there options for limiting the rights afforded by IPRs in individual cases on the basis of 
inadequately meeting market or societal demands? 
2 In this respect, how is the possibility of compulsory licensing evaluated? 
3 What mechanisms are available to establish reasonable and appropriate payment for the use 
of IPR-protected inventions in the general interest of society? 
In chapter 5 these scenarios are analysed in the legal context of national and international law 
and the legal consequences are discussed from both the perspective of small farmers and the 
economic realities facing developing countries. 
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4 The normative relation between IPRs relating 
to genetic material and farmer seed systems  
a perspective from international law 
The five scenarios described in chapter 3 refer to situations involving Farmer Seed Systems 
and raise questions regarding the normative relation between farmers participating in a Farmer 
Seed System and holders of an IPR (PBR or patent) relating to genetic material. This chapter 
discusses the concepts and rules of international law as a prelude to discussing the issues in 
more depth in the following chapter. Particular, reference is made to the TRIPS Agreement and 
the UPOV Convention (1991). In addition, we consider the relevance of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Ag-
riculture and relevant parts of the agreements reached as part of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation. 
4.1 The concept of international law 
International law is commonly defined as governing relations between States, which are con-
sidered by international law to be sovereign and independent institutions. International law is 
commonly considered as having two main constituent sources; customary international law and 
conventional international law. The former is formed on the basis of the practice of States and 
the latter is considered to consist of binding texts denominated as treaties, conventions, and 
agreements or otherwise. This chapter concentrates on conventional international law. 
In theory and practice international law is commonly constructed in a vertical manner. This 
means that the rules of international law, derived from the sources of international law, are 
constructed above States. Two forms of this vertical construction may be identified: an obligat-
ing form and an authorising form. In the obligating form the function of rules of international 
law is constructed as limiting the otherwise factual and normative freedom of States to act. In 
the authorising form, the function of international law is constructed as authorising States to 
act factually and normatively. In the absence of such rules, States are considered not to have a 
factual and normative power to act. It should be noted that the obligating form of international 
law is considered to constitute the predominant role within international law. 
In general, the application of rules of international law is considered to be limited to States. 
That means that these rules do not apply directly to members of societies that are situated 
within States. This also applies if the rules of international law confer rights upon members of 
societies, for example intellectual property, or human, rights. In this way, the rules of interna-
tional law only apply indirectly to members of societies situated within States, as a reflection 
of obligations imposed on States by rules of international law. It should be noted that, in both 
the theory of international law and in the practice of States, the rules of international law can 
apply directly upon members of societies situated inside States. However, this direct effect is 
dependent on the constitutions of States and not on rules of international law. Thus the consti-
tution of a State determines whether rules of international law apply directly to members of 
society situated inside the State. 
As with international law, the function of the internal law of the State is also constructed in a 
vertical manner. The same two forms of a vertical construction can be identified: an obligating 
form and an authorising form. In the obligating form, the function of rules of the internal law 
of the State limits the factual and normative freedom of members of society to act. The obligat-
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ing form is based on the assumption that, in the absence of internal rules, members of society 
have a factual and normative freedom to act. In the authorising form, members of society are 
allowed to act factually and normatively. The authorising form is based on the assumption that 
in the absence of such rules, members of society do not have a factual and normative power to 
act. In practice these two forms are commonly combined. 
4.2 The concept of Intellectual Property Rights 
The concept of intellectual property right (IPR) seems to combine both forms of the vertical 
construction of the function of the internal law of the State. On the one hand, it seems to as-
sume that the intellectual activity of members of society (inventors) is stimulated in an envi-
ronment in which the members of society have a factual and normative freedom to act. It is 
considered, however, that the freedom of other members of society to act may be detrimental to 
the interests of those performing this intellectual activity. By exercising their freedom to act, 
these other members of society might deprive inventors performing the intellectual activity 
from the fruits of that activity. In the obligating form, rules limiting the factual and normative 
freedom to act of the other members of society are relied on to protect the interests of those 
(the inventors) performing the intellectual activity. Hence, the concept of IPR seeks to protect 
the interests of inventors by conferring a right upon them to exclude acts of other members of 
society. The concept of IPR thereby adopts elements of the authorising and obligating forms of 
the internal law of the State. 
The concept of IPR is thus based on the assumption that the intellectual activity of an inventor 
should be protected. This assumption is not disputed in this report. At the same time, however, 
the inventor should not be able to hinder the intellectual activity of other members of society. 
Accordingly, the exclusive right conferred on the inventor must be limited, so that other mem-
bers of society can use the knowledge in further intellectual work. The same rights of protec-
tion will apply to this subsequent work. 
Interpretation of the latter is of primary concern in 
the area of agriculture, food and health where the 
application of an IPR protected invention, for so-
cially beneficial purposes, may depend on the appli-
cation on crops and in environments that are not 
covered by the inventor for economic or other reasons. 
In Section 2.5, reference was made to two ways of viewing the concept of a patent. In one 
view, a patent is regarded as a right conferred by society (or national legislation reflecting the 
interests of society) on an inventor. According to another view, a patent is the result of a con-
tract between society and an inventor. The authorising form of a vertical construction of the 
function of the internal law of the State follows the first approach. A patent is regarded as de-
pendent on, and conferred by, national legislation. The institution of the State is deemed to rep-
resent society at large. National legislation, which confers patents, is assumed to balance all the 
interests involved. If this first route is followed, this means that, although a patent may be re-
garded as an exclusive right, it is not an unlimited right. If it were, it would arrogate to the 
holder of the patent the right to determine the extent of the patent and disregard the role of the 
institution of the State and the factual and normative power and freedom of other members of 
society. 
IPR should not prevent use of protected 
technologies in crops and environments not 
covered by the patent holder. 
  The normative relation between iprs relating to genetic material and farmer seed systems 29
The concepts of sovereignty and independence commonly associated with the institution of the 
State imply that a State may adopt its own political, economic, social and cultural systems.1 In 
the context of IPRs, this freedom is considered to extend to and include IPRs. Thus, State A 
and State B may adopt diverging policies regarding IPRs. For example State A may consider 
that genetic material constitutes an appropriate subject matter for protection by an IPR, while 
State B may consider that it does not and that it cannot be protected by an IPR. Within the 
structure of sovereign equality (both State A and B are considered sovereign and independent) 
neither state can criticise the other for their policy stances. The exception to this is if rules of 
international law have been established which limit the respective freedoms of States. These 
freedoms are limited only to the extent of such international laws. In any consideration of such 
disputes between States A and B could thus be referred to the relevant rules of international 
law. 
It should also be noted that the concept of sovereignty is also deemed to include the resources 
of States (including economic or biological resources). According to Article 3 of the CBD, 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of interna-
tional law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-
mental or economic policies. This right also includes the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States, or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Similarly, Article 10.1 of the FAO Treaty 
provides that, in their relationships with other States, the Contracting Parties recognise the sov-
ereign rights of (other) States over their own plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. 
This includes the authority to determine access to those resources.2 
International humanitarian law, which is not considered here, provides other examples where 
international law recognises exceptions to absolute state sovereignty providing potentially use-
ful precedents. 
A distinction is commonly made between the terms intellectual property and industrial 
property. The term intellectual property is regarded as more comprehensive, comprising all 
rights relating to intellectual activity. The term industrial property is considered to cover all 
rights relating to intellectual activity with industrial application, but to exclude copyright. The 
concept of industrial property is further subdivided into specific rights, such as trademarks and 
patents. A patent is commonly defined as an exclusive right relating to an invention, which sat-
isfies the requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial application. A plant breeding 
right (PBR) is commonly defined as an exclusive right relating to a plant variety, which is new, 
distinct, uniform and stable. In this report, IPR is used to refer comprehensively to both patents 
and to PBRs. A PBR is essentially a sui generis form of IPR allowing the direct use, and not 
just the knowledge, of the patented product for further development. This is a very basic and 
important difference. 
4.3 Interpretation 
It is important to stress the role of interpretation in determining how the rules of conventional 
international law are applied to given situations. These rules are inferred from the texts of the 
applicable conventional international law. In this regard reference is often made to Article 
                                                   
1 Resolution 2625 (XXV), The principle of sovereign equality of States (e): Each State has the right freely to 
choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems. 
2 See also Resolution 3/91 of the Conference of the FAO, point 1: [Endorses] that nations have sovereign 
rights over their plant genetic resources. 
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31(1) of the Convention on the Law of Treaties. This prescribes as a general rule of interpreta-
tion that a treaty will be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in its context and in the light of its object and purpose. This 
rule of interpretation is also adhered to in WTO jurisprudence.3 
It should, however, be noted that the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty, in the context 
and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty, does not necessarily lead to a definitive 
interpretation of the text of the treaty, which can exclude other possible interpretations. In other 
words, the text of a treaty may allow two (or more) diverging interpretations, both of which 
may appear consistent with the text of the treaty. This space for interpretation can be viewed 
from different perspectives. On the one hand, it may be seen positively, as a flexible attribute 
that allows for adaptation of the treaties to developments in international society. On the other 
hand, it may be seen as revealing the inherently political character of conventional interna-
tional law. 
4.4 Conventional international law 
The scenarios described in the previous chapter refer to the TRIPS Agreement and to the 
UPOV Convention (1991). They relate to what is commonly referred to the sui generis option 
under TRIPS (Art.27(3)b) and inter alia to the Paris Convention (1882) for patents. In addi-
tion, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the International Treaty on Plant Ge-
netic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO Treaty) also have relevance for these scenarios 
in the light of conventional international law. This chapter describes these agreements in more 
detail in order to provide the basis for the more detailed examination of the implications of 
these scenarios that follows in chapter 5. 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV - 1991) 
The UPOV Convention (1991) seeks to harmonise the national plant breeders rights legisla-
tion of member states. These protect the normative position of plant breeders with respect to 
new varieties of plants by conferring an exclusive right, itself consisting of rights, on the plant 
breeder. Contracting Parties to the UPOV Convention (1991) have undertaken to guarantee to 
meet these obligations. This is specified in Article 2 of UPOV (1991), which states that the ba-
sic obligation of the Contracting Parties consists of granting and protecting PBRs. 
PBR is a sui generis IPR adapted to the special nature of biological materials in the form of 
newly bred plant varieties. It takes account of the evolutionary and step-wise process common 
to the breeding of new plant varieties, allowing use of results achieved previously as the raw 
material for further improvement. There is no requirement for a unique invention. The main 
requirement is that a variety is new in the sense of not having been commercialised before 
and Distinct from varieties of common knowledge. It should satisfy reasonable standards of 
Distinction and Uniformity to allow recognition, and Stability in further multiplication. These 
requirements are generally referred to as the DUS standards. The criteria for ownership are 
restricted, in that they are limited to commercialisation of the protected variety. Use of the pro-
tected variety in further breeding by other parties is not restricted. The following section pro-
vides a summary of the key Articles of the UPOV Convention. 
 
                                                   
3 Report of the Appellate Body, United States  Gasoline, 16-17; Report of the Appellate Body, Japan  
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 10-12. 
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Summary of major Articles of the UPOV Agreement 
Conditions of protection 
Article 5(1) UPOV (1991) enumerates the conditions of protection and provides that a PBR will be granted 
if a variety is new, distinct, uniform and stable. 
 
Criteria of protection 
Articles 6-9 of UPOV (1991) define criteria that determine whether those conditions are satisfied. Under Ar-
ticle 6, a variety is deemed to be new if, at the date of filing the application for a PBR, propagating or har-
vested material of the variety has not been sold, or otherwise disposed of, to others, by, or with the con-
sent of, the breeder for the purposes of exploiting the variety. This is subject to certain time limits. Article 7 
provides that a variety will be deemed to be distinct if it is clearly distinguishable from any other variety 
whose existence is a matter of common knowledge at the time of the filing of the application. Under Article 
8, a variety will be deemed to be uniform if, subject to the variation that may be expected from the particu-
lar features of its propagation, it is sufficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics. Article 9 stipulates that 
a variety will be deemed to be stable if its relevant characteristics remain unchanged after repeated 
propagation or, in the case of a particular cycle of propagation, at the end of each such cycle. Attention 
should be drawn to the circularity of these definitions. For example, the definition of the term distinct in Ar-
ticle 7 refers to the requirement that a variety be distinguishable. Similarly, the definition of uniform in Ar-
ticle 8 refers to the requirement that a variety be sufficiently uniform. In practice, this does not detract 
from the usefulness of these criteria. However, the interpretation and level of criteria applied remains sub-




Article 14(1)(a) specifies a number of acts in respect of the propagating material of a protected variety that 
require authorisation of the holder of the PBR. These include: production or reproduction (multiplication); 
conditioning for the purpose of propagation; offering for sale; selling or other marketing; exporting; import-
ing; and stocking for any of these purposes. Paragraphs 2-4 of Article 14 detail the rights of the PBR holder 
in respect of unauthorised use of propagating material and state that authorisation of the breeder is re-
quired unless the breeder has had reasonable opportunity to exercise his rights. These rights cover: acts in 
respect of the harvested material (para. 2); acts in respect of certain products made directly from the har-
vested material (para 3), and; possible additional acts that reasonably interfere with the rights of the PBR 
holder (para. 4). While PBR rights are essentially exhausted once protected varieties, obtained through 
channels authorised by the breeder, reach farmers fields, paragraphs 2-4 are included in order to provide 
reasonable opportunities for the breeder to exercise his rights on unauthorised use of his varieties. 
 
Essential derivation 
Article 14(5) relates to essentially derived and certain other varieties. It protects the breeder against use of 
his variety in a manner that does not involve a meaningful breeding effort and that retains the expression 
of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial vari-
ety. Hence, a variety is considered to be essentially derived if it results from selection of a natural or in-
duced mutant, or of a soma-clonal variant, the selection of a variant individual plant of the initial variety, 
from repeated backcrossing or from transformation by genetic engineering. 
 
Exceptions 
Article 15 deals with exceptions to the PBR. Article 15(1) provides that a PBR does not extend to: acts 
done privately and for non-commercial purposes; acts done for experimental purposes, and acts done for 
the purpose of breeding other varieties, and in respect of such other varieties. In addition, Article 15(2) 
provides that each Contracting Party may, within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the 
legitimate interest of the holder of the PBR, restrict a PBR relating to any variety. This can be done in order 
to permit farmers to use, for the purposes of propagation, on their own holdings, the product of a harvest 
that they have obtained, by planting the protected variety, on their own holdings. 
 
Exhaustion 
Article 16 deals with exhaustion of the PBR. Article 16(1) stipulates that the PBR will not extend to acts 
concerning: 
i) any material of the protected variety which has been sold, or otherwise marketed, by the holder of 
the PBR, or with his consent in the territory of the Contracting Party concerned, or; 
ii) any material derived from that material, unless such acts involve further propagation of the pro-
tected variety, or involve export of material of the protected variety which enables the propagation of the 
protected variety. 
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
The TRIPs Agreement became part of the WTO negotiations largely as a result of pressure 
from industrial countries. It was a response to the increased involvement of private industry, 
and notably since the 1980s large multinational agrochemical companies, in plant breeding 
and associated biotechnology activities, which had previously been largely carried out by pub-
lic institutions. This industry saw strengthened IPR protection of their varieties on a worldwide 
basis as the most effective way to obtain return on their investments. Central to this Agreement 
in the context of the present analysis is Article 27. 3(b), which states   Members will provide 
for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by 
any combination thereof. The most relevant articles in this agreement are outlined below. 
    
Review of relevant articles of the TRIPs Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement contains obligations upon States that concern trade-related aspects of IPRs. Part I 
contains general provisions and basic principles. Part II, Section 5, contains standards concerning the 
availability, scope and use of patents. 
 
Exhaustion, objectives and principles 
For the consideration of the scenarios, attention may be drawn to Articles 6-8, contained in Part I of the 
TRIPS agreement. Article 6 deals with the question of exhaustion of IPRs. According to Article 6, for the 
purposes of dispute settlement under the TRIPS Agreement, nothing in the Agreement will be used to ad-
dress the issue of the exhaustion of IPRs. Article 7 describes the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement. It 
states that the protection and enforcement of IPRs should contribute to the promotion of technological in-
novation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology. It specifies that this should be to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge, in a manner conducive to social and eco-
nomic welfare, and which maintains a balance of rights and obligations. Article 8 formulates the principles 
of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 8(1) provides that Members may, in formulating or amending their laws 
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the pub-
lic interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development. However 
any such measures should be consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 8(2) stipu-
lates that appropriate measures, so long as they are consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, may be needed to prevent abuse of IPRs by rights holders or the resort to practices which unrea-
sonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. 
 
Availability of patents 
Part II, Section 5, of the TRIPS Agreement deals with patents. Article 27(1) provides that patents will be 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Article 27(2) stipulates that 
Members may exclude certain inventions from patentability, if their commercial exploitation within the terri-
tory is considered to endanger public order or morality, including the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health and/or the avoidance of serious prejudice to the environment. However, such exclusions 
should not be made merely because such exploitation is prohibited under their law. Article 27(3)(b) pro-
vides that Members may also exclude from patentability plants and animals other than micro-organisms, 
and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes. It further provides that Members will provide for the protection of plant varieties 
either by patents, by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. 
 
Exclusive rights 
Article 28 determines the rights conferred by a patent. Article 28(1)(a) provides that, where the subject 
matter of a patent is a product, exclusive rights are conferred on the owner to prevent third parties, who do 
not have the owners consent, from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these pur-
poses that product. Article 28(1)(b) provides that, where the subject matter of a patent is a process, exclu-
sive rights are conferred on the owner to prevent third parties, who do not have the owners consent, from 
using that process and from using, offering, selling or importing for such purposes, the product obtained 
directly by that process. It should be noted, however, that pursuant to footnote 6 of Article 28, that while 
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Exceptions 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement deals with exceptions to the rights conferred. Article 30 stipulates that 
Members may provide for limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner. Such exceptions must take the legitimate in-
terests of third parties into account. 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was a major outcome of the United Nations 
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Its ob-
jective was to safeguard biological diversity worldwide, to promote sustainable use of such 
resources and to facilitate appropriate access and fair and equitable sharing of benefits accruing 
from the use of genetic resources. Emphasis is placed on national sovereignty over natural bio-
logical diversity and the responsibility of States to take the necessary actions to conserve such 
diversity. Obligations include the development of national strategies, plans and programmes 
for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, the identification and monitoring of biodi-
versity, research, training and public education. In the context of the present document, the ob-
ligation to respect IPRs, wherever they are recognised is important. This obligation must, how-
ever, conform to the objectives of the Convention (Article 16). 
 
Review of relevant articles of the CBD 
 
Definitions 
The central concept in the Convention on Biological Diversity is the concept of biological diversity. Accord-
ing to Article 2 of the CBD, biological diversity means the variability amongst living organisms from all 
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological com-
plexes of which they are part. The concept includes diversity within species, between species and of eco-
systems. Article 2 further defines genetic material as any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin 
containing functional units of heredity. Genetic resources are defined in Article 2 as genetic material with 
an actual or potential value. 
 
Objectives 
Article 1 of the CBD defines the objectives of the CBD as the conservation of biological diversity, the sus-
tainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation 
of genetic resources. This is specified as including appropriate access to genetic resources, appropriate 
transfer of relevant technologies (taking into account all rights over such resources and technologies), and 
by appropriate funding. 
 
Sovereignty 
Article 3 defines as a principle that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies. They also have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or to areas beyond the limits of their 
national jurisdiction. 
 
In Situ Conservation and Sustainable Use 
Article 8 addresses the objective of in-situ conservation. Article 8(j) provides that each Contracting Party 
will, as far as possible and as appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and 
maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional 
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. Contracting parties will 
with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices, promote 
their wider application and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of 
such knowledge, innovations and practices. Article 10 addresses the objective of sustainable use of com-
ponents of biological diversity. Article 10(c) CBD provides that each Contracting Party will, as far as possi-
ble and as appropriate, protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with 
traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation and sustainable use requirements. 
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Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Articles 15 and 16 address the objective of the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilisation of genetic resources. Article 15 CBD deals specifically with access to genetic resources. Article 
16 CBD deals specifically with access to and transfer of technology. 
 
Access to Genetic Resources 
Article 15 deals with access to genetic resources. Article 15(1) provides that, given the sovereign rights of 
States over their natural resources, the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with na-
tional governments and is subject to national legislation. Article 15(4) provides that access, where granted, 
will be on mutually agreed terms. Article 15(5) provides that access to genetic resources will be subject to 
prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by 
that Party. 
 
Access to and Transfer of Technology 
Article 16 CBD deals with access to and transfer of technology. Article 16(1) provides that each Contract-
ing Party undertakes to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other Contracting Parties of 
technologies relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic 
resources that do not cause significant damage to the environment. The second sentence of Article 16(2) 
provides that in the case of technology subject to patents and other IPRs, such access and transfer will be 
provided on terms that recognise, and are consistent with, the adequate and effective protection of IPRs. 
Article 16(5) provides that the Contracting Parties, recognising that patents and other IPRs may have an 
influence on the implementation of the CBD, will co-operate in this regard in order to ensure that such 
rights are supportive of, and do not run counter to, its objectives. Such co-operation will be subject to na-
tional legislation and international law. 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO) 
The FAO Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO Treaty) has its 
origin in the early 1980s. There was an increased awareness of perceived inequalities in access 
to and use of the remaining genetic diversity important to agriculture. It was argued that cen-
tres of origin of most crops are located in the tropics and sub-tropics, mainly in developing 
countries. Such resources are, with few restrictions, accessed by plant breeders in developed 
countries and the resulting products (improved varieties), are subsequently subject to PBR pro-
tection. It was recognised that there was a need for developing countries and farmers that sup-
ply sources of genetic diversity to share in the benefits of such plant breeding. After long and 
often acrimonious debate it was finally agreed that, in the interest of agriculture, genetic re-
sources important to crops should be viewed as a Common Heritage of Mankind This con-
cept entails open access. Also relevant in this context are the requirements for a Mutual Trans-
fer Agreement (MTA) and the principle of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) that were introduced 
by the CBD to safeguard the interests of countries and farmers supplying genetic diversity for 
use in plant breeding. It was also realised and stated in a resolution in 1989 that in the sui 
generis PBR protection the principle of open and unrestricted access for further breeding of 
protected varieties remained upheld. These principles seemed to provide a reasonable balance 
between interests. However, the development of biotechnology protected by exclusive patent 
rights pertaining to GM varieties upset this balance. The FAO Treaty differs from the CBD in 
that it is primarily concerned with (potential) genetic diversity in agriculture, whereas the CBD 
is primarily concerned with natural biodiversity. Equally importantly, the emphasis of the CBD 
on the national sovereignty over genetic resources appears to be in conflict with the basic prin-
ciple of agriculture that views the genetic resources for food and agriculture as a Common 
Heritage of Mankind. This common heritage principle appeared in the text of the FAO Inter-
national Undertaking on PGR preceding the FAO Treaty, but was excluded from the latter to 
avoid conflict with the CBD. These tensions illustrate once again the basic problem of reliance 
on international agreements negotiated in different fora with different objectives. The attempt 
to make the FAO Treaty compatible with the CBD led to an arduous process of negotiation in 
the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, particularly in or-
der to address the issue of benefit sharing. As a compromise it was proposed to establish a mul-
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tilateral agreement to which countries may voluntary subscribe. This facilitates open access to 
genetic resources for specifically identified crop species in a Multilateral System of Access and 
Benefit Sharing. 
 
Review of relevant articles of the FAO Treaty 
 
Objectives 
Article 1 defines the objectives. Article 1.1 provides that the objectives of the FAO Treaty are the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable shar-




Part III, consisting of Article 9, deals with Farmers´ Rights. In Article 9.2 the Contracting Parties agree that 
the responsibility for realising Farmers´ Rights, as they relate to PGRFA, rests with national governments. 
Article 9.2 further provides that, in accordance with their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party 
should, as appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect and promote Farm-
ers´ Rights. These measures can include: 
i. protection of traditional knowledge relevant to genetic resources; 
ii. the right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources; 
and 
iii. the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of genetic resources. 
Article 9.3 specifies that the concept of Farmers´ Rights will not be interpreted as limiting any rights that 
farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed or propagating material, subject to national 
law and as appropriate. 
 
Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing 
Part IV, consisting of Articles 10-13, establishes a Multilateral System of Access and Benefit Sharing. Arti-
cle 10.1 provides that, in their relationships with other States, the Contracting Parties recognise the sover-
eign rights of States over their own genetic resources, including that the authority to determine access to 
those resources rests with national governments and is subject to national legislation. Article 10.2 stipu-
lates that, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, the Contracting Parties agree to establish a multilateral 
system, which is efficient, effective and transparent. This is intended to facilitate access to genetic re-
sources and to ensure that the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources are shared in a fair 
and equitable way and in a complementary and mutually reinforcing basis. 
 
Facilitated Access 
Article 12 deals with facilitated access to PGRFA within the Multilateral System. Article 12.3(d) provides 
that recipients of PGRFA will not claim any IPRs or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the 
PGRFA or their genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral System. Article 
12.3(f) provides that access to PGRFA protected by IPRs and other property rights will be consistent with 
relevant international agreements and relevant national laws. 
 
Benefit Sharing 
Article 13 deals with benefit sharing in the Multilateral System. Article 13.2(b)(i) provides that access to, 
and transfer of, technology, improved varieties and genetic material will be provided and/or facilitated, 
while respecting applicable property rights and access laws. Article 13.2(b)(iii) stipulates that such access 
to and transfer of technology will be provided on terms that recognise and are consistent with the adequate 
and effective protection of IPRs. 
4.5 International institutions 
Several international institutions are relevant in connection with the scenarios set out in chapter 
3. These include the WTO, the FAO, the WIPO, the UPOV and the bodies of the CBD. These 
international institutions have varying relationships with the international conventions, treaties 
and agreements described in Section 4.4. 
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CBD 
Article 23(1) of the CBD establishes a Conference of the Parties. According to Article 23(4) 
the Conference of the Parties will keep under review the implementation of the CBD and per-
form the functions set out therein. In addition, Article 24(1) establishes a secretariat and de-
fines its functions. The CBD has thus established its own institutional bodies that are not for-
mally related to an existing international institution. 
UPOV 
According to Article 23 of the UPOV Convention (1991), the Contracting Parties establish and 
are members of a Union. According to Article 24(1), the Union has a legal personality. Article 
25 provides that its permanent organs are the Council and the Office of the Union. The tasks of 
the Council are enumerated in Article 26(5). As with to the CBD, the UPOV Convention has 
thereby established its own institutional bodies. 
FAO Treaty 
Article 19.1 of the FAO Treaty establishes a Governing Body. Article 19.3 provides that the 
functions of the Governing Body will be to promote the full implementation of the treaty and 
in particular the performance of the tasks enumerated therein. In addition, Article 20.1 provides 
for the appointment of a Secretary whose functions are defined in Article 20.2. Article 1.2 fur-
ther determines that the objectives of the FAO Treaty, set out in Article 1.1 will be achieved by 
closely linking the FAO Treaty with the FAO. According to the last recital of the Preamble, the 
FAO Treaty is concluded as an international agreement within the framework of the FAO under 
Article XIV (1) of the Constitution of the FAO. The treaty is a result of the work of the Com-
mission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA), established under Article VI 
(1) of the Constitution of the FAO.4 It is important to note, however, that this does not provide 
the FAO as an international institution, its organs (Conference; Council) or the Commission 
with competences with regard to the FAO Treaty. The FAO Treaty is therefore formally linked 
to the FAO, but simultaneously constructed as an autonomous structure. 
WTO 
The TRIPS Agreement is a Multilateral Trade Agreement that forms Annex 1C to the Agree-
ment establishing the World Trade Organisation. In accordance with Article II(2) of this 
Agreement, it is an integral part of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation. 
The main organs of the WTO are the Ministerial Council and the General Council, established 
respectively by Articles IV(1) and IV(2) of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Or-
ganisation. In addition, Article IV (5) establishes a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPS) with the task of overseeing the functioning of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Article VI (1) establishes the Secretariat of the WTO. The WTO differs 
from the other international institutions and bodies that we have considered previously in it has 
a formal and binding mechanism (the Dispute Settlement Body - DSB) for the settlement of 
trade disputes between members. This is set out in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which forms an integral part of the Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organisation. Article 3(2) of the DSU provides that the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability in 
the multilateral trading system. Members recognise that it serves to preserve their rights and 
obligations under the covered agreements, which includes the TRIPS Agreement, and to clar-
ify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpre-
tation of public international law. It provides further that the recommendations and rulings of 
                                                   
4 Resolutions 9/83 and 3/95. 
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the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided for, inter alia, in the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
WIPO 
The WIPO is not formally connected to any of the four international agreements considered in 
Section 4.4, but does play a central role with respect to IPRs. According to Article 3(1) of the 
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation, its objectives include the 
promotion of intellectual property throughout the world through co-operation among States 
and, where appropriate, in collaboration with other international organisations. In addition, 
WIPO is responsible for performing the administrative tasks of the Paris Union, established by 
Article 1(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Members of the WTO 
are required to comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of this Convention, pursuant to Article 2(1) of 
the TRIPS Agreement. In addition WIPO has established an Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, which is rele-
vant to consideration of the scenarios.5 
4.6 Interrelations 
Relations between conventions, treaties and agreements 
To understand how these treaties, conventions and agreements, relate to the scenarios discussed 
in chapter 3, it is first necessary to outline the normative relationships that exist between them. 
In the theory of international law and in the practice of States, an international agreement is 
regarded as an autonomous instrument that reflects the collective will of the States / contract-
ing parties with respect to the subject matter regulated therein. This means that all applicable 
agreements should be applied simultaneously. In addition, it is assumed that such agreements 
(or provisions contained within them) are not in conflict with one another.6 
If conflicts do exist between different international agreements (or provisions contained within 
them) there are two ways in which such conflicts can be dealt with under international law: 
 the relation between the international agreements may be determined in the texts 
thereof; 
 the relation between those international agreements may be determined by virtue of the 
rules (i) lex posterior derogat priori and (ii) lex specialis derogat generali.7 
We fist consider the possibility that relationship between international agreements is deter-
mined in the texts thereof8. Article 1.2 of the FAO Treaty provides that the objectives defined 
in Article 1.1 of that treaty will be attained by closely linking the FAO Treaty to the CBD. At 
the same time, recitals 9-11 of the Preamble determine that the relation between the FAO 
Treaty and other treaties or conventions is not to be understood as representing a relation of 
hierarchy.9 
                                                   
5 WO/GA/26/6; WO/GA/26/10. 
6 Report of the Panel, Indonesia  Automobile Industry, 14.28. 
7 [Pauwelyn, Role, ] 
8 Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 30 (2). 
9 Preamble, recitals 9-11 ITPGRFA: Recognising that this Treaty and other international agreements relevant 
to this Treaty should be mutually supportive with a view to sustainable agriculture and food security; Affirm-
ing that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as implying in any way a change in the rights and obliga-
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Article 22(1) CBD claims a qualified precedence over other international agreements. This 
means that the provisions of the CBD will not affect the rights and obligations of any Contract-
ing Party deriving from any other existing international agreement, except where the exercise 
of those rights and obligations would cause serious damage or threat to biological diversity.10 
However, it must be noted that a full hierarchy between the CBD and other treaties, conven-
tions and agreements would also require the recognition of the precedence of the CBD in rele-
vant other international agreements. In addition, the precedence of the CBD over other agree-
ments is dependent on establishing the occurrence or potential danger of serious damage or 
threat to biological diversity caused by the exercise of rights and obligations deriving from that 
other international agreement. 
We can conclude therefore that the texts of these international agreements do not provide suffi-
cient basis for establishing a hierarchical relation between these agreements. The rule of lex 
posterior derogat priori (the later treaty prevails over the earlier treaty)11, only applies if both 
treaties deal with the same subject matter.12 This does not appear to be the case with the inter-
national agreements under consideration in this report. Although the subject matter of these 
agreements may be related, their subject matter may be said to be different. Application of the 
lex specialis derogat generali (a special treaty prevails over a general treaty)13, requires the 
establishment of a relation of generality-speciality between international agreements. It seems 
difficult to establish such a relationship between the international agreements that we are con-
sidering. For example, the CBD deals with biodiversity in both a general and specific sense. 
The conclusion is that the rules of international law do not provide a sufficient basis to estab-
lish a hierarchy between these various international agreements. However, this issue arises 
only if one international agreement (or a provision of) is considered to conflict with (a provi-
sion of) another.14 Such a conflict would then lead back to the question of the interpretation of 
conventional international law, referred to in Section 4.3. In view of the inherent flexibility of 
interpretation of conventional international law, it is commonly considered that the interpreta-
tion of conventional international law should be directed at avoiding conflicts between (the 
provisions of) different agreements.15 This is sometimes referred to as harmonious interpreta-
tion. 
Relations between international institutions 
 If the question of the normative relation between IPRs relating to genetic material and Farmer 
Seed Systems falls within the competence of different international institutions, the question of 
the normative relation between those international institutions must also be addressed. This 
question can fall within the competence of the WTO (trade relations between Members), of the 
FAO (agriculture) and of the WIPO (protection of intellectual property). Accordingly, the ques-
tion of the normative relation between these international institutions arises. With regard to this 
question, the constitutions of international institutions commonly provide for the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                                          
tions of the Contracting Parties under other international agreements; Understanding that the above recital is 
not intended to create a hierarchy between this Treaty and other international agreements. 
10 Marceau, Conflicts, 1090-1091. 
11 Marceau, Conflicts, 1091-1092. 
12 Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 30 (3). 
13 Marceau, Conflicts, 1092-1093. 
14 In this connection, reference may be made to the diverging positions adopted within the TRIPS Council 
over the question whether the TRIPS Agreement conflicts with the CBD; TRIPS Council, Relationship, 5-13. 
15 Marceau, Conflicts, 1086-1090. 
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concluding agreements of co-operation with other international institutions.16 One such Co-
operation Agreement was concluded between the WTO and the WIPO in 1996. However, this 
Agreement does not address questions such as the interpretation, and application, of conven-
tional international law to specific situations.17 In this context, it seems the WTO, the FAO and 
the WIPO all have a competence to address the question of the normative relation between 
IPRs relating to genetic material and Farmer Seed Systems, but that none of these organisa-
tions have an exclusive competence in this area. 
                                                   
16 Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Articles XIII(1); Convention 
establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, Article 13(1); Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Articles III(5) and V(1). See also CBD: Decision VI/6 and Decision VI/20. 
17 In the Agreement between the IMF and the WTO, which seems similar in this regard, the Appellate Body 
explicitly remarked that it does not provide any substantive rules concerning the resolution of possible con-
flicts between obligations of a Member under the WTO Agreement and obligations under the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF or any agreement with the IMF; Report of the Appellate Body, Argentina  Footwear, 
72. 
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5 International agreements, national law and 
farmer seed systems 
This chapter analyses implications of international and national law (as described in chapter 4) 
on the workings of Farmer Seed Systems. It does so in a dialectical manner, on the basis of the 
scenarios described in chapter 3. These scenarios illustrate, in a general sense, the potential 
legal problems arising when biological material containing patent protected characteristics is 
released into the environment and a transfer of such characteristics through natural, or other 
means, takes place. In a more specific sense, the scenarios consider how patent protection can 
conflict with the established principles of Farmer Seed Systems and the culture of farming 
communities. 
5.1 Applying international and national law to Farmer Seed 
Systems: Legal perspectives 
We asked responsible staff within the relevant international institutions to comment on, and 
respond to, the scenarios set out in chapter 3. Their responses commonly emphasised the flexi-
bility of applicable conventional international laws. For example, the Secretariat of UPOV 
stressed that UPOV 1991 seeks to harmonise the national legislation of the Contracting Parties 
with regard to the protection of new varieties of plants. Ultimately, however, the authority to 
interpret the provisions of UPOV 1991 lies in the hands of the Contracting Parties. Thus, the 
question of where the authority lies to interpret the provisions of UPOV 1991 was answered by 
reference to the national legislation of the Contracting Parties. Similarly, the Secretariat of the 
WTO made reference to the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement, under which a Member may 
challenge the national legislation of another Member. A persisting dispute between Members 
might be resolved through the dispute settlement system of the WTO. The Secretariat of the 
WIPO also suggested that, in the absence of compulsory dispute settlement, the authority to 
interpret conventional international law relating to IPRs lies with governments as a matter of 
national sovereignty. The question is whether, since IPR has now have become subject to the 
TRIPS agreement, responsibility for settling disputes might now lie with the WTO. 
These Secretariats thereby seem to confirm that the question of interpretation lies at the heart 
of conventional international law. This suggests that the general rule of interpretation pre-
scribed in Article 31(1) of the Convention on the Law of Treaties, which refers to the ordinary 
meaning of the text, the context and the object and purpose of the treaty, does not provide de-
terminate rules of conventional international law. This presents a basic challenge to the concept 
of international law as such. If the interpretation of rules of international law is ultimately de-
pendent on the internal law of States, the rules of international law do not seem to limit the fac-
tual and normative freedom to act of States in any meaningful way. At the same time, this read-
ing presupposes that the internal law of the State is not affected by similar problems of inter-
pretation. 
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5.2 Applying international law and national law to Farmer Seed 
Systems: Farmers perspectives 
The rights of traditional subsistence farmers to continue to operate within their own agricul-
tural and socio-economic context is a central concern of the present study. These rights seem to 
be largely overlooked in the various international agreements. Even the FAO Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
does not give explicit expression to such rights. 
In the FAO Treaty (Article 9.2), Farmers Rights 
are defined as follows: 
Contracting Parties agree that the responsibility 
for realising Farmers Rights rests with national 
governments, and each Contracting Party should, as appropriate and subject to its national 
legislation, take measures to protect and promote Farmers Rights, including: (a) protection of 
traditional knowledge relevant to Plant Genetic Resources; (b) the right to equitably partici-
pate in sharing of benefits arising from utilisation of plant Genetic Resources; and (c) the right 
to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to conservation and 
sustainable use of plant Genetic Resources. 
A number of observations seem relevant here. 
 
The Farmers Rights concept was adopted in the FAO Treaty to provide a balance against IPR 
in industry and PBR in commercial plant breeding. It appeared to solve the problems that arose 
in the negotiations of this international agreement. However, what does it mean to farmers, 
who were conspicuously absent from these negotiations and only represented by national pol-
icy makers? 
Traditional Farmer Seed Systems were confronted with: 
 a concept assigning rights on sharing in benefits which would seem to imply monetary 
value assigned to their genetic resources and, as a consequence, 
 the introduction of a concept of ownership of genetic resources that is vested in farmers or 
farming communities. 
What was seemingly not fully understood is that 
both these concepts are in total contradiction to 
the basic principles of free and open access that 
have been practised throughout the history of 
agriculture. Free access has been fundamental to 
the practices of plant breeding and the function-
ing of Farmer Seed Systems. It is central to the 
socio-economic context in which traditional 
farmers operate. It may be argued that the concept of Farmers Rights, embedded in this treaty, 
does at least give credit to farmers as important suppliers of genetic resources that have been 
harnessed, improved and conserved by their activities. It recognises, in principle, the right of 
farmers to share in the benefits that accrue from the use of their genetic materials. However, 
the agreements did not create mechanisms through which this principle could be implemented 
in a way that would provide real benefits to farmers. Rather, this responsibility was conven-
iently referred to national legislation. Nations retain sovereign rights over their plant genetic 
resources and in some (the Philippines, and member countries of the Andes Pact) farmers are 
involved in establishing arrangements for Prior Informed Consent (PIC) which seek to balance 
International agreements seem to largely 
ignore the rights of farmers to operate within 
their own agricultural and socio-economic 
context 
Interpretation of Farmers' Rights in terms of 
individual or community ownership over 
genetic resources contradicts with principles 
of free exchange and mutual inter-
dependance that forms the basis of traditional 
agriculture 
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restrictions on access by requirements to promote use. However, the question of whether such 
arrangements will provide real benefits to farmers remains unanswered. 
Even before the adoption of the FAO Treaty and the CBD, a number of practical issues became 
apparent, in effect limiting the concept of Farmers Rights in providing real benefits to farmers. 
 First, there are practical difficulties in assigning monetary value (and ownership) to genetic 
resources. The market for genetic resources used by farmers has many potential suppliers 
but few, if any, buyers. The main sources of genetic diversity for commercial plant breed-
ing are the numerous gene banks that, by now, contain a large and easily accessible reser-
voir of genetic diversity collected prior to the FAO Treaty and the CBD coming into force. 
The question of whether or not such collections are subject to these agreements is till unre-
solved and remains a matter of debate and interpretation. Even if they are, the records of 
many collections (such as those held by the CGIAR) lack sufficient geographical precision 
to identify the original owners. The records mostly just contain a description of general lo-
cation and the physical characteristics of the collection site. Only recently has the knowl-
edge of the farmers growing the collected material also been documented. 
 Secondly, due to the process of evolution of genetic diversity in farmers fields, as ex-
plained in Chapter 2, assigning individual or even communal ownership in a fair manner is 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. 
 Thirdly, claiming ownership over planting material as a genetic resource is foreign to the 
cosmo-vision of farmers. Most plant breeders also share this vision. It is upheld in the sui 
generis Plant Breeders Rights legislation as harmonised by the UPOV Convention in 
which even PBR protected varieties are viewed as a free resource for further breeding. This 
represents a basic value in the philosophy of agriculture, which is apparently poorly under-
stood by policy makers and legal experts. 
The concept of Farmers Rights therefore appears not only to be an empty shell but can even be 
construed as an attempt to impose a system of ownership on farmers to justify appropriation of 
genetic resources by industrial interests that conflict with the universal interests of agriculture 
in general. Basically the conflict is about two views on agriculture; agriculture as an economic 
activity and agriculture as a biological activity, the products of which happen to have economic 
value. 
Another problem that raises questions of interpretation is the relation between the FAO Treaty 
and the CBD on the issue of National Sovereignty over genetic resources. Nation States are 
assumed to have sovereignty over their territorial resources including genetic resources. The 
FAO Undertaking, preceding the FAO Treaty, after long and often acrimonious debates settled 
on a modest interpretation that views the genetic resources of crops as a Heritage of Man-
kind. It was realised that agriculture, plant breeders and farmers benefit from access to gene 
pools of crops across national borders. The CBD, however interpreted National Sovereignty in 
the context of natural biological diversity in a stricter sense, with two objectives in mind. First, 
to place responsibility for the conservation of such resources squarely in the hands of national 
governments and, secondly, to counter the perceived unethical appropriation of genetic re-
sources by foreign interests, sometimes referred to as bio-piracy. This interpretation was 
adopted in the negotiations in the FAO Commission that led to the final text of the FAO Treaty 
in an attempt to make it more consistent with the CBD. 
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The CBD provides two instruments to facilitate 
national sovereignty and government control. 
The concept of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) 
aims to inform farmers about the purposes of 
collection and obtain their consent prior to col-
lection of genetic resources. The second, Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs), regulates the 
conditions for transfer and use. These concepts facilitated the negotiation processes in the in-
ternational policy arena and seemed to level the playing field. However, their practical imple-
mentation can create bureaucratic barriers, which restrict access to genetic resources for plant 
breeding. This has a negative impact on plant breeding and may ultimately be harmful to farm-
ers in general. This is already becoming evident in the plant breeding activities of the publicly 
funded Future Harvest Institutes of the CGIAR, which are occasionally encountering problems 
in retrieving experimental materials from international testing programs for further improve-
ment. To cope with these problems, a major purpose of the FAO Treaty was to include a Multi-





Need for policy change 
The TRIPs Agreement explicitly recognises the need of developing countries for maximum flexibility in im-
plementing their patent laws in ways that enable them to create a sound and viable technological base. It 
contains several provisions that give countries the flexibility to grant exceptions to patent rights under cer-
tain circumstances. Article 30 provides a broad authority for countries to grant exceptions when the inter-
ests of the patent holder will not be adversely affected. Article 31 provides the authority for countries to 
provide for compulsory licenses, subject to some conditions, when the rights of the patent holder are af-
fected. Furthermore, Article 27.3(b) permits countries to exclude plants and animals from patentability alto-
gether, provided an alternative sui generis system of protection is provided. This is an important opportu-
nity for countries that might judge it in their interests to adopt a system of plant variety protection that al-
lows for the use of protected plants in the breeding of new varieties and for farmers to save their seed for 
planting the next year. These provisions reflect the reality documented by expert commissions and com-
mentators that the patents and other intellectual-property needs of developing countries vary and can be 
sharply different from the needs of industrialised countries. 
From: American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change. RFF 
Report, Michael Taylor and Jerry Cayford, 2003. 
http://www.rff.org/rff/news/features/american-patent-policy-biotechnology-and-african-agriculture.cfm 
 
Except for the FAO Treaty, the overall conclusion is, that the agendas of various international 
agreements, while seemingly protecting national interests, do not adequately consider the re-
quirements of agriculture or the interests of farmers. The main interest of farmers is the avail-
ability of, and access to, improved varieties of crops adapted to their environment, cultural 
practices and household requirements. These benefits are far more important to farmers than 
benefits that may, if at all, accrue from compensation for use of genetic resources for plant 
breeding. Questions of the ownership of genetic resources and of establishing their relative 
contribution to a new variety (developed through often complex breeding programmes involv-
ing numerous parental lines) are both based on vague concepts and are largely incompatible 
with Farmers Seed Systems. 
The issue then, in our view, is not how to refine 
and make Farmers Rights operational, but to 
formulate and adopt appropriate sui generis pat-
ent protection that benefits both the inventor and 
farmers and that satisfies the special nature of 
biological materials. The latter issue has 
strangely, but perhaps not surprisingly, been missed in the international debate. Recognition of 
Agriculture, plant breeding and farmers 
benefit from open access to genetic 
resources across national borders 
Except for the FAO Treaty, international 
agreements do not seem to adequately 
consider the requirements of agriculture and 
the interests of farmers 
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the special nature of biological materials would fundamentally conflict with the appropriate-
ness of exclusive patent rights on GM varieties. 
The WTO/TRIPS Agreement provides Nation States the space to include these considerations 
in formulating national legislation. TRIPS states in Article 1.1 (Nature and Scope of Obliga-
tions) that: Members may, but will not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive 
protection than required by this agreement and will be free to determine the appropriate 
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and 
practice. The overall economic justification for moderating exclusivity of legal ownership is 
detailed in Box 5.1. 
This wording seems to give support to Article 9.3 of the FAO Treaty, which specifies that the 
concept of Farmers Rights will not be interpreted as limiting any rights that farmers have to 
save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed and propagating material, subject to national law 
and as appropriate. This Article would seem to be fully in accordance with the practices of 
Farmer Seed Systems, in which farmers produce their own seed on farm and practice open ex-
change without claiming ownership of the genetic constitution of the material. However, the 
added subject to national law and as appropriate has important consequences; if there is no 
national law, the FAO Treaty does not provide farmers with any rights. 
Through bilateral trade agreements, pressures are already being exerted, notably by the US, to 
grant more extensive protection than is required under the TRIPS Agreement (Correa, 1999). 
Current disputes over IPR in medicines may indicate what can be expected to happen with re-
gard to patenting in GM crops. For instance, it has been reported that, at the end of 1999, the 
US Trade Representative was involved in 46 current actions against poor countries for using 
internationally accepted and WTO compliance measures such as compulsory licensing and 
parallel import to save lives (ACT-UP, 1999). The WHO has noted that some countries have, 
formally and informally, reported pressures to exclude TRIPS provisions intended to safeguard 
access to essential drugs from their national legislation (WHO, 1999). In a similar vein, the 
US and other Western industrialised countries are leading a concerted effort through WIPO to 
achieve international harmonisation of patent law beyond that provided in the TRIPS Agree-
ment with regard to plant biotechnology (Taylor and Cayford, 2003). 
Considering present political and economic realities, it would seem likely that many develop-
ing countries will continue to be pressured to include patent protection of GMOs in their legis-
lation. This will probably especially apply to GMOs developed and patented under US and EU 
law by the same international corporations who are lobbying for protection for pharmaceuticals 
that exceeds the requirements of TRIPS and who are strongly opposing the application of com-
pulsory licensing in the general interest. 
The attitudes of industrial countries and WIPO contradict the stated objectives of patents to 
benefit society by promoting useful inventions whose performance is properly evaluated from 
the perspective of the social outcomes they achieve. If, as is generally claimed, biotechnology 
has the potential to make significant contributions to world food security and human welfare, 
the policies of industrial countries that promote strong world-wide patent protection and op-
pose compulsory licensing are denying or hindering developing countries from gaining access 
to such technologies. Such policies appear to be in conflict with the full support that industrial 
countries have pledged for, amongst others, the United Nations Millenium Development Goals 
(see Taylor et al, 2003) the objective of which is the eradication of extreme poverty and hun-
ger. 
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5.3 Analysis of the Scenarios 
In this section we explore the relevant provisions of the four agreements that we see as relevant 
to the scenarios set out in chapter 3 and summarised in figure 1. In addition, we outline rele-
vant provisions in the national legislation of the selected States. We remark at the outset that it 
does seem possible to exclude extreme interpretations, which involve disregarding the interests 
of other members of society. Beyond that, the relevant provisions do not provide definitive 
guidance regarding the question of how to structure the normative relations between the differ-
ent interests involved. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of Scenarios 
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The set of scenarios was developed to illustrate this lack of clarity and, in particular, the prob-
lems encountered when the functioning of international agreements is confronted by totally 
different social and agricultural constructs. These scenarios are meant to analyse the conse-
quences of legal ownership regimes on biological materials employed in agriculture, as embod-
ied in WIPO, WTO/TRIPS and UPOV and the related needs for the conservation of such re-
sources for the common good, as reflected in the CBD and the FAO Treaty. A primary concern 
on which these scenarios are based is the functioning of these various agreements as part of the 
body of international law, in the context of Farmer Seed Systems, which represent the major 
source of planting material for a majority of farmers and crops in developing countries. A ma-
jor cause of problems is the inherent conflict between the exclusive ownership afforded by pat-
ents and the capacity of biological materials for self-reproduction and hybridisation. Effective 
containment of these natural phenomena is necessary for enforcing such rights, but contain-
ment is not only difficult, it also goes against the cultural and social structures of many socie-
ties depending on traditional agriculture and free exchange of planting material. 
Scenario 1: Access to and use of modern varieties by small farm-
ers 
Scenario 1 concerns the access to modern varieties by farmers participating in Farmer Seed 
Systems, and the use of these modern varieties by those farmers. It is assumed that the modern 
varieties are the property of a commercial breeder. It is further assumed that the commercial 
breeder is the holder of an IPR (PBR or patent) over these modern varieties. The first question 
that is raised in scenario 1 is whether farmers participating in a Farmer Seed System can have 
access to those modern varieties. The second question is whether farmers participating in a 
Farmer Seed System, who have obtained a modern variety, can subsequently exchange genetic 
material of this modern variety, or, whether such exchange contravenes the IPR. This question 
is raised both with respect to a patent and to a PBR . 
Legal perspective 
The first question is whether farmers participating in Farmer Seed Systems can have access to 
modern varieties. Planting material protected by a PBR is considered to be the property of the 
holder of the PBR. The PBR holder is obliged to provide an adequate supply at a price that in-
cludes a license fee for use. The main restriction is that farmers cannot sell the PBR protected 
variety as seed for planting to other farmers. In case of a patent, ownership covers the patented 
characteristic. Here, the access of farmers is dependent on the consent of the holder of the IPR. 
The holder of a patent cannot be compelled to grant access to a modern variety protected by 
the IPR. Facilities such as compulsory licensing, which are considered in scenario 5, constitute 
exceptions to this principle. IPRs are most normally enforced (at least in the US) by means of 
a contract between the holder of the IPR and the farmer(s). Farmers participating in a Farmer 
Seed System could also obtain access to such modern varieties through this means, allowing 
the holder of the IPR to receive remuneration. 
The question that then arises is whether farmers participating in a Farmer Seed System can be 
prevented from subsequently exchanging the genetic material within the Farmer Seed System. 
Most respondents addressed this question from the context of the UPOV Convention (1991). 
The provisions of Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, relating to micro-organisms and 
microbiological processes, do not generally seem to be seen as requiring the patentability of 
genetic material or processes relating to genetic material. 
  International agreements, national law and farmer seed systems 47
Patent law 
Examples where patent law applies to this issue can be found in the national legislation of the 
Philippines and of Brazil. Under Subsection 22.4, of the IPR Code of the Philippines, plant 
varieties, animal breeds and essential biological processes for the production of plants and 
animals are excluded from patent protection. Article 10(IX), of Lei 9.279 of Brazil, relating to 
industrial property, provides that the whole or parts of natural living beings and biological ma-
terials found in, or isolated from, nature, including the genome or germplasm of a natural liv-
ing being and natural biological processes, are not to be considered as inventions. Article 
18(III) provides that the whole, or parts of, living beings are not patentable, except transgenic 
micro-organisms which conform to the three requirements of patentability  novelty, inventive 
activity, and industrial application  and are not a mere discovery. 
The TRIPS agreement provides a potentially different perspective on the question of exchange 
of genetic material within a Farmer Seed System. Here the key question is the extent of the 
exclusive rights conferred by Article 28 of the Agreement, and the related question of the ex-
haustion of these exclusive rights, which is excluded from the TRIPS Agreement under Article 
6. Thus, from a legal perspective we cannot answer conclusively whether the exchange of the 
genetic material within a Farmer Seed System would infringe Article 28, of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, as we do not know the extent of the rights conferred. It could be argued that such ex-
change infringes this right; but it could also be argued that if the genetic material enters the 
Farmer Seed System, the right has been exhausted. 
The national laws that we have examined commonly consider that a patent is exhausted once it 
has been placed on the market. Reference may again be made to the national laws of the Phil-
ippines and Brazil. Section 71, of the IPR Code of the Philippines, determines that a patent will 
confer the following exclusive rights on its owner: 
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to restrain, prohibit, and prevent any un-
authorised person or entity from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing that 
product; 
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to restrain, prevent or prohibit any unau-
thorised person or entity from using the process, and from manufacturing, dealing in, us-
ing, selling or offering for sale, or importing any product obtained directly or indirectly 
from such process. 
Section 72 deals with limitations of patent rights and outlines the circumstances in which the 
owner of a patent does not have the right to prevent third parties from performing, without his 
authorisation, the acts referred to in Section 71. Subsection 72.1 concerns the use of a patented 
product which has been put on the market in the Philippines by the owner of the product, or 
with his express consent, insofar as such use is performed after that product has been put on 
the said market. Subsection 72.2 concerns acts done privately and on a non-commercial scale, 
or for a non-commercial purpose, provided that it does not significantly prejudice the eco-
nomic interests of the owner of the patent. 
Similarly, Article 42 of the Lei 9.279 of Brazil, relating to industrial property, determines that a 
patent confers on its holder the right to impede third parties, who without consent, produce, 
use, prepare for sale, sell or import for these purposes. It states that it concerns (i) the product 
that is the object of the patent and (ii) the process or the product obtained directly from the pat-
ented process. Article 43 provides that the disposition of Article 42 does not apply to acts of 
third parties, not authorised by the holder of the patent, of a private character and without 
commercial purpose, if these do not cause prejudice to the economic interest of the holder of 
the patent. It does not restrict third parties who, in the case of patents relating to living mate-
rial, use without economic purpose the patented product as the initial basis for variation or 
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propagation to obtain other products. The implication here is that this does not restrict the use 
of the patented product for non-commercial purposes, including multiplication and propagation 
of the living material in question. 
According to the Indian respondent this question does not arise in the context of patents as the 
Patent Act 1970 specifically excludes genetic material from patentability. 
If we consider that a patent is not exhausted when the genetic material is exchanged within a 
Farmer Seed System, this leads to consideration of whether the exchange of genetic material 
within a Farmer Seed System falls within the limited exceptions provided in Article 30 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. These must satisfy the requirement that they may not unreasonably conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent and that they may not unreasonably prejudice the le-
gitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of third par-
ties. The question of whether exchange of the genetic material within a Farmer Seed System 
satisfies this requirement depends on definitions of what constitutes a normal exploitation of 
the patent, what conflicts unreasonably with it, as well as balancing the legitimate interests of 
the patent owner and third parties. The subjectivity of these criteria (normal; unreasonable; le-
gitimate) permits interpretations that view the exchange of the genetic material within a Farmer 
Seed System as both falling within and outside this exception. 
Plant breeders rights 
Most respondents in this study viewed the question of the exchange of genetic material within 
a Farmer Seed System from the context of the UPOV Convention (1991). This then raises the 
questions of the exceptions to the PBR, and of the exhaustion of a PBR, dealt with respectively 
in Articles 15 and 16 of the UPOV Convention. 
Article 15(1) of the UPOV Convention provides that the PBR will not extend to: 
(i) acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes; 
(ii) acts done for experimental purposes; and 
(iii) acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties. 
In addition, Article 15(2) of the UPOV Convention provides that each Contracting Party may, 
within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the 
breeder, restrict the breeder´s right in relation to any variety. This is in order to permit farmers 
to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest that they 
have obtained by planting a protected variety or essentially derived variety on their own hold-
ings. 
The Secretariat of UPOV indicated that exchange of genetic material protected by a PBR 
within a Farmer Seed System may be covered by the exception provided in Article 15(1)(i). In 
October 2004 UPOV plans to consider whether the exchange of genetic material within a sub-
sistence oriented Farmer Seed System may be interpreted as an act done privately and for non-
commercial purposes. The respondent commenting on the national legislation of El Salvador 
believed that this interpretation should be upheld and adopted. 
The Indian respondent answered that the question can only be answered from the context of 
PBRs and farmers rights. The exchange of genetic material protected by a PBR within a 
Farmer Seed System would be compatible with Section 39(1)(iv) of the Protection of Plant Va-
rieties and Farmers´ Rights Act. This Article bestows the right to farmers to save, use, sow, 
resow, exchange, share or sell their farm produce, including seed of a variety protected under 
the Act, in the same manner as they were entitled to do before the Act came into force. How-
ever, it should be noted that this Act does not comply with either UPOV 1978 or 1991. 
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In the case of the Phillipines our respondent answered this question by reference to Section 
43(d) of the Plant Variety Protection Act. This legislation limits the rights of holders of a Cer-
tificate of Plant Variety Protection, which do not extend to the traditional rights of small farm-
ers to save, use, exchange, share or sell their farm produce of a variety protected under the Act. 
An exception to this is made when such a sale is for the purpose of reproduction under a com-
mercial marketing agreement. Section 43(d) provides further that this provision also extends to 
the exchange and sale of seeds among, and between, said small farmers: Provided, that the 
small farmers exchange or sell seeds for reproduction and replanting on their own land. The 
respondent recognised that, although this exception seems to create a compatibility between 
PBR and exchange of genetic material within a Farmer Seed System, the terms used (small 
farmers; commercial marketing agreement) are vague and require further clarification. The Na-
tional Plant Variety Protection Board, instituted pursuant to Title XI of the Plant Variety Protec-
tion Act, has been designated to determine the conditions under which the exception will apply, 
taking into consideration the nature of the plants cultivated, grown or sown. We also note that 
Article 43(d) of the Plant Variety Protection Act does not seem entirely consistent. For exam-
ple, the sentences preceding and following the word Provided seem to confer a right on 
farming communities, even though the word Provided suggests a contrast between the two 
sentences. In addition we note that the allocation of the burden of proof is important in the in-
terpretation of this provision. For example, who bears the burden of proof in respect of the ex-
ception to the rights conferred? Is it the holder of the PBR or the farming community? 
Brazils position is set out in Article 10 of the Lei 9.456, relating to Plant Variety Protection. 
This complies with UPOV 1978, but not to UPOV 1991. This provides that a PBR is not in-
fringed if someone: 
(i) saves and plants seeds for their own use, on their establishment or on the establishment of 
a third party which they hold; 
(ii) uses a variety as a basis for variation in genetic improvement; 
(iii) being a small rural producer, multiplies seeds, exclusively for other small rural producers, 
in the context of programmes for financing or support of small rural producers, conducted 
by public organs or NGOs authorised by the Public Power. 
Section 3 of the Article sets out criteria that specify what constitutes a small rural producer. 
Our respondent commenting on the position of national legislation of Nicaragua considered 
that the exchange of genetic material protected by a PBR within a Farmer Seed System would 
be incompatible with Articles 8 and 9(b) of Ley 318 de Proteccion para las Obtenciones Vege-
tales. They also considered that an IPR (patent or PBR) protecting genetic material extends to 
any genetic material in which it is incorporated. 
By contrast the respondent commenting on the national legislation of Uganda considered that 
an IPR (patent or PBR) is exhausted in the case of exchange of genetic material within a 
Farmer Seed System. It was considered that if a protected variety of planting material has been 
put on the market, with the consent of the patent holder, that their right to control such use is 
exhausted. This means that the farmer has the right to share it with fellow farmers, to resell or 
to donate it. 
Concluding remarks 
Overall then, these responses create a very mixed picture (see Table 1). At one extreme,(in 
Nicaragua) the exchange of genetic material protected by an IPR within a Farmer Seed System 
is considered to be incompatible with the exclusive rights conferred by an IPR. The other re-
spondents consider that the exchange of genetic material within a Farmer Seed System may be 
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compatible with the PBR and, between them, they identify at least three bases for this 
compatibility: 
(1) The position that such exchange consists of acts done privately and for non-commercial 
purposes: this position was suggested by the Office of UPOV as a possible interpretation 
and was shared by the respondent commenting on the national legislation of El Salvador; 
(2) The position that such exchange falls within provisions specifically applying to exchange 
(and other acts) between farmers that relate to farm produce and seed. The respondents 
commenting on the national legislation of India and the Philippines adopted this position. 
(3)  The position that such exchange falls outside the reach of the PBR because the PBR is 
exhausted once the genetic material is freely put on the market. The respondent comment-
ing on the national legislation of Uganda adopted this position. The national legislation of 
Brazil provides an extensive catalogue of exceptions to both rights, which may accommo-
date the exchange of genetic material within a Farmer Seed System. These vary according 
to whether the scenario is considered on the basis of a patent relating to a transgenic mi-
cro-organism or on the basis of a PBR. 
Table 1: Summary of the question whether farmers participating in a Farmer Seed System 
are allowed to subsequently exchanging the genetic material within the Farmer Seed Sys-
tem. 
Respondent context of Patent Law context of PBR 
TRIPS regulations are inconclusive  
UPOV  exchange is allowed 
Philippines is not applicable regulations are inconclusive 
Brazil is not applicable exchange is not allowed 
India is not applicable exchange is allowed 
El Salvador  exchange is allowed 
Nicaragua exchange is not allowed exchange is not allowed 
Uganda exchange is allowed exchange is allowed 
Canada  Exchange is not allowed 
It should be noted that interpretations which permit the exchange of genetic material within a 
Farmer Seed System appear to be compatible with the concepts of a PBR, as set out in Articles 
8(j) and 10(c) of the CBD and with Article 9.3 of the FAO Treaty. (See previous section). 
However, these articles, especially 8(j) of the CBD and 9(3) of the FAO Treaty are so vague 
and open to conflicting interpretations that, it may be difficult in practice to implement them in 
the spirit in which they were formulated. 
Farmers perspective 
As stated in Chapter 4, modern varieties protected by PBR are available to farmers with few 
restrictions. These generally do not infringe the farmers customary privilege of saving seeds 
from the harvest for next years planting. Whether or not exchange of seeds with other farmers 
in Farmer Seed Systems is allowed under PBR, when, as is usually the case, it is not done for 
commercial purposes remains open to question. 
However, problems do arise when farmers use IPR-protected GMOs. In some countries (India, 
the Philippines, Uganda) varieties may be excluded from IPR protection. The question is 
whether such exclusion will be upheld under economic trade pressures. As suggested in section 
5.1 the industries and countries that dominate biotechnology take seriously the need for adher-
ence to patents in this field. Furthermore, in most cases, GM varieties are sold under individual 
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contracts, that generally state that the farmer will not use harvested seed for replanting on his 
own farm, nor exchange such seeds with other farmers for the same purpose. Even if farmers 
are willing to abide by these conditions, they may not be able to prevent other farmers acquir-
ing some seeds and using them as planting material for further multiplication. A case in point is 
the reported on-farm multiplication and spread of Monsanto GM (herbicide tolerant) soybean 
through farmer exchange in Argentine and smuggled across the border into southern Brazil and 
Uruguay (see box 5.6 under Scenario 5). 
Farmers in the Philippines who were consulted by SEARICE, stated that they would be very 
reluctant to use GM varieties under strict contractual conditions, as they realised that their cir-
cumstances make it extremely difficult to adhere to such conditions. They not only fear possi-
ble court action, but even are concerned for the safety of their families or property by illegal 
retaliatory actions of seed middleman taking the law in their own hands. Hence, unless the 
rights of the IPR or contract holder are exhausted when genetic materials enter Farmer Seed 
Systems, such legislation will restrict the access of small farmers to new technology by setting 
conditions that are impossible to comply with. It may even lead to illegal actions, that threaten 
the livelihood of farmers and the safety of their families. 
Scenario 2: Gene-flow in traditional agriculture 
Scenario 2 is concerned with gene flow from modified genetic material protected by an IPR to 
genetic material that forms part of a Farmer Seed System (introgression). It raises the question 
of whether the farmers participating in a Farmer Seed System may be regarded as infringing 
the IPR. A second question is whether the holder of the IPR can prevent the farmers participat-
ing in the Farmer Seed System from using the genetic material. It also raises the converse 
question of whether the holder of the IPR may be liable for damage caused to the genetic mate-
rial forming part of the Farmer Seed System. 
Legal perspective 
For these questions, Plant Breeders Rights as defined in the UPOV agreement are our main 
reference. The respondent from UPOV observed that Article 15(1)(iii) of the UPOV Conven-
tion (1991) provides that a PBR does not extend to acts done for the purpose of breeding other 
varieties and acts in respect of such other varieties. As a consequence the farmers participating 
in the Farmer Seed System cannot be prevented from using the genetic material for further 
breeding in the way that the scenario describes. The respondent commenting on the national 
legislation in Uganda shared this view. 
In contrast, the respondent commenting on the national legislation of Nicaragua considered 
that, pursuant to Article 9(b) of Ley 318 de Proteccion para las Obtenciones Vegetales, the pro-
tection of the IPR extends to the introgressed material. In the case of El Salvador, this question 
was answered in the context of the TRIPS Agreement, which led to a similar conclusion to that 
from Nicaragua. 
Differing views were also expressed over the question of whether the holder of the IPR may be 
liable for damage caused to the genetic material that forms part of the Farmer Seed System. 
The respondent referring to the national legislation of India considered that, in the case of un-
desirable introgression from a transgenic variety to their landraces, a community may demand 
damages or protection under the Environmental Protection Act 1986. However, it was added 
that this situation would normally be pre-empted by provisions of that Act which require a 
prior assessment by the Environmental Regulatory Authority of the likely impact of releasing a 
transgenic variety on a landrace. Any dispute would be more likely to arise between the com-
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munity and the Environmental Regulatory Authority rather than between the holder of the IPR 
and the community. 
The respondent commenting on the national legislation of Uganda remarked that the holder of 
the IPR can only be held liable only if the requirements determining liability for damage as 
established in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher are satisfied. Alternatively it might be possible to 
establish a case under the law of negligence, but this may be difficult to prove. However, it was 
noted that there is growing pressure for a regime that imposes liability on holders of uncon-
tained modified genetic material. 
The respondent referring to the national legislation of the Philippines considered that, it may be 
possible in theory to sue for damages in the case of contamination by introgression. However, 
in practice it may be difficult to prove damage to genetic material, or that such damage was 
caused by introgression of modified genetic material. 
Although our information relating to this scenario is less complete than for scenario 1, we can 
draw some observations (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Summary of the answers of the repondents to the two questions posed in Sce-
nario 2. 
Respondents Is use of introgressed IPR allowed? Can the IPR-holder be held liable? 
UPOV yes  
Nicaragua no  
El Salvador no  
India  is possible, but it is difficult to prove 
Uganda  see response India 
Philippines  see response India 
As the Office of UPOV suggested in discussion, scenario 2 may not pose any problem for a 
Farmer Seed System if it is resolved on the basis of the concept of PBR. This concept is based 
on the idea that a protected variety may form the basis of the development of other varieties. 
The practice of the farmers therefore seems entirely consistent with the concept of PBR. How-
ever, this may not be so straightforward. For instance, in Canada the Sale of Goods Act in-
cludes exchange within its definition of a sale. Canada has therefore interpreted farmer ex-
changes of material as sales and as a result these are not permissible under UPOV 1978. 
If scenario 2 is considered on the basis of patents relating to genetic material, a number of con-
siderations seem to apply. 
 First, if a patent relating to genetic material would extend to genetic material with which 
the protected genetic material combined or into which it introgressed, it would override 
and disregard any right of property of another member of society relating to that genetic 
material. The proposition that a patent extends to other genetic material in this manner 
seems to be based on an assumption that is inconsistent with the interests of other members 
of society. This is perhaps even clearer if this question is answered on the assumption that a 
Farmer Seed System is not based on a concept of property. Although this may be the case, 
a Farmer Seed System does involve interdependent intellectual activity. If it were consid-
ered that introgressing genetic material protected by an IPR could extend to the genetic 
material forming part of a Farmer Seed System, this would be inconsistent with the basis of 
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the concept of IPR. This holds that the work of (a) member(s) of society (in this case the 
farmers participating in a Farmer Seed System) should not be susceptible to appropriation 
by other members of society, and that those members of society who have performed the 
work should be able to reap the benefits of thereof. 
 The last question concerns the possibility of claiming damages from the holder of the IPR 
for contaminating the genetic material of a Farmer Seed System. In this context we note 
that it seems difficult in practice to satisfy the requirements of a law relating to damages: 
proof of damages, proof of causality, and proof of fault. Given these difficulties, we do not 
believe that this would be a fruitful way forward. Yet, in contrast to this The European Un-
ion Liability Directive, currently under negotiation, does propose that GM containment be 
recognised as offering grounds for liability claims. 
Farmers perspective 
Once genetic material is introduced into the environment, natural hybridisation with surround-
ing compatible materials of the same crop will inevitably take place. The spread of seeds can-
not be prevented, irrespective of their legal status. This is not just an issue in traditional agri-
culture, where the same crops are grown by different farmers in small fields in close proximity 
to one another. A telling example is reported from New Zealand (Wills, 2003). Non-GMO seed 
and feedstock imported from North America were found to be widely contaminated with IPR-
protected GMOs resulting from outcrossing or accidental mixing. The reasons are obvious. 
Seeds can be carried long distances on farm machinery, during transport and by other means 
and pollen can travel by wind or insects over considerable distances and cause hybridisation. 
All this makes the complete containment of transgenes grown in the field impossible. Granting 
exclusive legal ownership over such materials therefore seems inappropriate, even if it other-
wise satisfies conditions for IPR. A seminal court case on this issue (Monsanto Canada vs. 
Schmeiser) in Canada started in 1997 and led to a ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
May 2004. (See box 5.2). This ruling provides companies with broad powers of exercising pat-




Canadian Supreme Court rules against farmer in biotech dispute. 
Canadas highest court sided with Monsanto Co. in a seven-year dispute over technology in farming, giving 
the agri-business company titan broad rights under patent law to control its genetically engineered crops. 
The legal battle dates from 1997 when Monsanto found a canola variety that it had engineered to resist its 
powerful Roundup weedkiller on Percy Schmeisers farm. The farmer contended that he was an innocent 
bystander and that the seeds of the Monsanto variety arrived in his fields through accidental means, such 
as loss during transport by blowing off a passing truck and/or through natural pollination from neighbouring 
fields. Furthermore he contended that he did not use the Roundup weedkiller, hence did not benefit from 
the genetically engineered resistance. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and validated Mon-
santos patent and gave the company the broadest authority to exercise it, apparently regardless of how 
such seeds or the patented characteristic had appeared in farmers fields or in his planting material. It ruled 
that that the farmer had to turn over all remaining crops and seeds to Monsanto. Andrew Kimbell, director 
of the Center for Food Safety, A Washington D.C. based watchdog said that it would set a disturbing 
precedent if biotech companies own not just the gene transferred in a crop variety but everything that it 
gets into. Farmers, especially in developing countries, fear that natural or accidental contamination of their 
crops and their farmer varieties with IPR protected biotech varieties will give biotech companies like Mon-
santo licenses to seize their crops and varieties.  Agbios/Associated Press; May 23, 2004 
 
Monsanto and private industry in general will probably be pleased with this legal victory, but 
may well come to regret it. The ruling would seem to ignore biological realities and ignore the 
broader interests of farmers. 
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If IPR-protected ownership extends to accidental transfer, it immediately raises the legal issue 
of liability. As noted earlier, the European Union Liability Directive, currently under negotia-
tion, proposes that GM containment be recognised as offering grounds for liability claims 
Companies are protesting. However, legal ownership would seem to imply liability. Once IPR-
protected biological materials are freely circulating, they cannot be recalled, nor does science 
currently have the tools that can selectively remove the patented characteristic from their mate-
rial, except by an extensive selection activity identifying non-introgressed individual plants as 
base material for further propagation. Hence the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada does 
not provide clarity. It raises a spectre of numerous, and potentially very substantial, liability 
claims. The main beneficiary will be the legal profession. The biotechnology industry can look 
forward to increased legal costs while such court cases will further damage the acceptance of 
biotechnology in agriculture. 
Box 5-3 
 
Problems of enforcement of IP 
Farmers across the Indian state of Gujarat have implemented small-scale on-farm breeding programs to 
incorporate the patent protected Bt gene, conferring insect resistance into other strains of cotton. Apart 
from some token raids, the government has done little to stop proliferation of these private breeding pro-
grams. It is impossible to control something at this scale. When we go to the fields, we become targets for 
trying to take away a beneficial technology from farmers said A.K.Dixit, director of Agriculture. AgBiotech 
Reporter. July 2003. 13 
 
Because PBR is grounded in an agricultural philosophy, accidental or biological contamination 
offers no problems, since the rights concerning use by farmers who obtained their planting ma-
terial through channels authorised by the breeder are exhausted once the protected materials 
are in the field. On the other hand, strict enforcement of exclusive patent rights on particular 
GM traits, that cannot be contained within varieties, can lead to a multitude of bizarre situa-
tions in Farmer Seed Systems. The question arises, for instance, whether the patent holder of a 
transgene could prevent farmers from using their own landraces if they have been naturally 
contaminated. According to the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada, this would be the case, 
and would include the obligation to hand over contaminated seeds and harvested product to the 
patent holder. As stated in the legal analysis of this scenario, such a position would be inconsis-
tent with the concept of IPR, namely that work of (a) member(s) of society, in this case farmers 
participating in a Farmer Seed System, should not be susceptible to appropriation by other 
members of society which prevents them from benefiting from the fruits (their landraces) of 
their work. If that is the case, and considering that it will be extremely difficult to differentiate 
between accidental and wilful contamination for further on-farm selection, the patent protec-
tion of a transgenic characteristics will be virtually meaningless under conditions of a Farmer 
Seed System (see boxes 5-1 and 5-3). This, presumably, played a role in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada not to differentiate between accidental or wilful contamination. 
From a legal point of view this might make sense, but considering the laws of biology, which 
are not open to re-interpretation, it creates absurd situations. 
 
However, according to a recent report (www.checkbiotech.org, 2004) Monsanto is considering 
the possibility of trying to collect royalties on crop shipments at the point of entry into the US. 
Janice Armstrong, a Monsanto official, said that they will ask to test shipments of soybean 
from Brazil and Argentina that are not accompanied by appropriate licences for use of patent-
protected herbicide tolerance. If found positive for round-up ready soybean, Monsanto would 
request payment of royalties on the shipment. This might seem a reasonable course of action, 
and compatible with protection under PBR Article 14(2). However, if such a course of action 
were approved, it could lead to soybean material that has been accidentally contaminated 
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through natural pollination or seed dispersal also being liable for royalty payments. This would 




Co-existence of GM and non-GM varieties 
The British Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) in a report titled GM Crops: 
Coexistence and Liability deals with the most important issues concerning co-existence and liability when 
GM crops are introduced into farmers fields. The AEBC advises a number of legal measures that should 
be adopted prior to the approval of GM crops. These include, for instance, legislation concerning liability 
for harm to the environment and a package of measures of compensation to farmers whose fields are con-
taminated with GM materials. The report suggests a trial period for co-existence of GM crops with conven-
tional crops and biological agriculture, noting problems in ensuring freedom of seeds from GM contamina-
tion during seed production, storage and accidental mixing at harvest, cross pollination, transport etc. The 
report further elaborates on what measures can be taken within the legal context, which are constrained by 
EU regulations including zonation (GM free zones). The only options available are agricultural measures 
such as isolation distances, control during storage, crop rotation and others, none of which will completely 
prevent contamination. 
IGD, Consumer Watch 2003, August edition: GM Food and Farming: What are Consumers latest views? 
http:www.igd.com/ConsumerWatchaugustContents.pdf 
 
Farmers who wish to keep their crops free from contamination by transgenes, to avoid such 
consequences, or for any other reason, will face serious problems. Contamination is difficult to 
avoid. Claiming damages will be legally extremely difficult. As Box 5.4 shows, this is not just 
a problem for developing countries. 
Suggested measures to avoid introgresssion by isolation through zonation, control during stor-
age, crop rotation and others are extremely difficult to implement and, even if practical, will 
not exclude occasional, or even frequent, contamination. This is well recognised by insurance 




Transgenic risk excluded from insurance 
According to this newspaper article, the British action group FARM interviewed five major Insurance Com-
panies (Norwich Union, Sun Alliance, the Royal Insurance Group and the mutual insurance companies of 
the National Farmers Union and NFU Mutual) about possibilities for farmers insuring against transfer of 
IPR material through such events as accidental seed mixing, seed spilling or natural pollination. These 
companies specifically excluded transgenic risks from their agricultural policies, both for causing, or being 
subject to, such transfers. The reason given was, that the uncertainties were too great, i.e. that such 
events are very difficult to avoid. 
Algemeen Dagblad 09.10.2003 
 
The reported illegal introduction of a GM variety of soybean across the border of Argentina 
into Brazil, suggests that this problem cannot even be solved individually by nation-states (see 
Box 5-6 on page 62). 
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Scenario 3: Collection of local landraces 
Scenario 3 may be seen as an extension of scenario 2 in the context of the role of a gene bank. 
A gene bank may be seen as an intermediary between farmers, as contributors to a gene bank, 
and plant breeders who use genetic material provided by the gene bank for further breeding. 
When genetic material contributed to the gene bank is protected by an IPR, this raises the ques-
tion of the normative relation between the holder of the IPR and the plant breeder, as well as of 
the responsibility of the gene bank. 
Legal perspective 
In the case of Nicaragua, it was considered that, under national legislation, both the gene bank 
and the breeder may be responsible to the holder of the IPR. This is because the IPR extends to 
situations in which the genetic material is entered into a gene bank and subsequently distrib-
uted for multiplication. 
In Uganda, the national legislation differentiates responsibilities, according to the practice of 
the gene bank. The gene bank may be responsible if it identifies and selects the genes that it 
banks and determines the ownership of individual genes. In contrast, if the gene bank does not 
identify individual genes, it is not responsible for the genetic material that it distributes. If it is 
considered that both the gene bank and the breeder acted in good faith, the holder of the IPR 
cannot claim legal rights in respect of the genetic material. Conversely, it is considered that the 
breeder cannot claim compensation from the holder of the IPR for not containing the genetic 
material or for that genetic material contaminating the seed stock. It was noted that gene con-
tamination is bound to occur with all new varieties. In such a natural process, it is very difficult 
for a breeder to contain genetic flow. If compensation were allowed, it would keep rotating 
from one breeder to another. In this situation, the notion of the exhaustion of rights should be 
reversed to protect breeders because they retain no control over genetic material once it has 
been sold on. 
Although we had relatively few responses to this question, we are generally in agreement with 
this response. If a patent relating to genetic material cannot extend to any genetic material that 
the protected material combines with, or into which the genetic material introgresses, then a 
fortiori it cannot extend if this material is subsequently collected for a gene bank. 
In practice legal answers and interpretations as to whether farmers, gene banks or plant breed-
ers knew or ought to have known about the presence of IPR protected traits in their material 
will, in many instances pose an insurmountable obstacle. The ruling of the Supreme Court of 
Canada (see Box 5.2) appeared to provide legal clarity on this point, but its effects illustrate 
that one-size-fits-all patents applied to biological materials are totally unworkable. 
Plant breeding perspective 
Farmers do not normally require material from gene banks. Gene banks only conserve small 
samples of seeds, mainly as a resource for plant breeding. An exception to this sometimes 
arises when, because of natural calamities or wars, farmers have lost their original farmer va-
rieties (landraces). Cambodia is an illustrative example. Many farmer varieties of rice were lost 
during Pol Pots regime, and were subsequently re-introduced from the gene bank of the Inter-
national Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines. Hence, instead of a farmers per-
spective, the perspective given here is from the position of plant breeding. 
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The collection, conservation and documentation of genetic diversity important for food and 
agriculture are urgent, in view of the serious threat of genetic erosion. Genetic erosion takes 
place through replacement of original landraces by uniform modern varieties, by destruction of 
habitats of wild relatives of crop species, by replacement of minor crops by those with higher 
market value etc. Genetic diversity forms the basis of plant breeding. No nation or gene-bank 
meets all the present or potential requirements for national or international plant breeding, even 
for individual crops. Therefore, from the 1980s onwards, close international co-operation has 
begun under the aegis of the FAO Global Plan for Genetic Resources and the FAO Treaty. In 
the past collection activities, which are focused in the original centres of diversity, (primarily 
located in the tropics and sub-tropics) were generally carried out with few restrictions, empha-
sising a common interest in conservation of a dwindling resource. However, the coming into 
force of the CBD stressing national sovereignty and control, has had a negative impact on this 
co-operation. There are exaggerated expectations about the immediate commercial value of 
genetic resources. This, in combination with the strict interpretation of national sovereignty in 
the CBD, results in bureaucracy, complicating collection and access to genetic diversity be-
tween countries. This is harmful to plant breeding and (ex situ) conservation at large. Hence, 
ironically, while the CBD was meant to promote the conservation and use of biological diver-
sity, for genetic resources it appears to be having the opposite effect. 
The FAO Treaty attempts to minimise this negative impact by facilitating a multilateral system 
of open exchange of genetic resources for food and agriculture between countries, which is 
free of bureaucratic obstacles. When the dust settles, it may be expected that national govern-
ments will realise the benefits of open exchange to their agriculture and food production and 
opt for expanding the FAO multilateral system. 
However, the main concern of scenario 3 is the nature of the problem created by biotechnol-
ogy. What is the position of gene banks when they collect landraces which inadvertently con-
tain IPR-protected transgenic characteristics and distribute such materials to plant breeders? 
Many gene banks now require recipients to sign a Material Transfer Agreement in which the 
gene bank disclaims any knowledge of such introgressed IPR protected transgenic characteris-
tics. Assuming that all goes well with biotechnology and many such transgenic characteristics 
are reaching farmers fields, they will undoubtedly transfer to other local materials through 
natural hybridisation. Such materials may be collected by gene banks and enter their collec-
tions without them having knowledge of contamination by IPR-protected characteristics. When 
subsequently distributed to plant breeders, the presence of an IPR-protected characteristic 
might only be identified when the new variety is released. In such an event, what are the rights 
of the original IPR holder in relation to the rights of the breeder of the new variety? This may 
be a theoretical problem, partly because the time needed for collection, release and inclusion in 
a new variety may well be longer than the period for which the IPR is valid. Gene banks, how-
ever, require clear and unambiguous guidance about how to deal with such events and what the 
legal consequences might be. This should be included in legislation in order to avoid complex 
and costly legal procedures, which will add to the costs of plant breeding and ultimately will 
raise the price of new varieties to farmers. Already it has been reported that, in the absence of 
legal clarity, protecting legal rights in biotechnology substantially increases the cost of such 
research and thus of its products to farmers. 
Scenario 4: The concept of ´essential derivation´ 
Scenario 4 concerns the question of whether landraces can be freely used and modified in order 
to obtain a new variety on which PBR can be claimed. The concept of essential derivation ap-
plies only when an initial variety is protected by a PBR. This is usually not considered possible 
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in the case of a landrace. But does this mean that a landrace can be used freely in order to de-
rive a new variety on which PBR can be claimed regardless of the level of essential derivation? 
Legal perpective 
In response to this question the UPOV Secretariat remarked that the concept of essential deri-
vation can only be relied on if the initial variety is protected. In the situation described in this 
scenario, the initial variety is a local landrace and does not seem to be protected. Therefore, the 
owner of the landrace cannot claim that the resulting variety is essentially derived from the 
landrace. 
The respondent interpreting the Indian national legislation emphasised that, apart from new 
plant varieties, both extant and farmers´ varieties are eligible for protection under the Protec-
tion of Plant Varieties and Farmers´ Rights Act. This means that in the case described in ques-
tion 4.1 the breeder would, pursuant to Sections 23(6) and 43 of the Protection of Plant Varie-
ties and Farmers´ Rights Act, require authorisation from the farmer or community for any 
commercial exploitation if the variety is essentially derived from the initial variety. 
The response referring to the national legislation of Nicaragua considered that the concept of 
essential derivation does not apply in this case, because the initial variety is not protected. Al-
ternatively, however, it was considered that a community might rely on the Political Constitu-
tion, which provides that all genetic resources are part of the national patrimony and belong to 
the State. 
In Ugandas national legislation, it was considered that the community does not hold IPRs on 
its landraces. This means that it is impossible for a community to oppose an application to reg-
ister a derived variety. Nevertheless, the respondent commented that, from a community per-
spective, such a grant would be irregular and therefore open to challenge. 
In Brazil, a new or essentially derived variety is susceptible of protection under Article 4 of Lei 
N° 9.456. Article 3(IX) defines an essentially derived variety as a variety essentially derived 
from another variety if, cumulatively: 
(a) it was predominantly derived from the initial variety or other essentially derived variety, 
without losing the expression of the essential characteristics resulting from the genotype 
or combination of genotypes of the variety from which it was derived, except for the dif-
ferences resulting from the derivation and; 
(b) it is clearly distinct from the variety from which it was derived, by a minimum margin of 
descriptors, in accordance with criteria established by the competent authority. 
Article 3(IV) defines a variety as distinguishable from other varieties in accordance with the 
minimum margin of descriptors, which is homogenous and stable. Article 3(V)-(VIII) sets out 
the criteria of newness, distinctiveness, homogeneity and stability. Article 3(III) defines the 
minimum margin as the minimum ensemble of descriptors, as determined by the competent 
organ, sufficient to differentiate a new variety or essentially derived variety from other sur-
rounding varieties. These provisions may suggest that the landrace, as changed by the breeder, 
cannot be regarded as an essentially derived variety, because the landrace itself cannot be re-
garded as a variety under the meaning of Article 3(IV). This would mean that the landrace as 
changed by the breeder would itself need to satisfy the criteria of Article 3(V)-(VIII). However, 
this answer depends on whether landraces are included in the comparison prescribed by Article 
3(III). 
These various interpretations are summarised in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Can the concept of essential derivation be applied to landraces? 
Respondent Answer 
UPOV No, only possible with protected varieties 
India Yes 
Brazil Yes, if landrace meets DUS requirements 
Nicaragua No, following UPOV regulations  
Yes, following Political Constitution 
Uganda No, but IPR is challengable 
Some additional observations should be made about this scenario. The concept of essential 
derivation is intended to extend the PBR of a breeder to a variety that is so close to the pro-
tected variety that it would be unfair if another member of society could appropriate it. This 
seems to be a fair concept, even though it may be difficult to define in legal terms. In the situa-
tion considered in scenario 4, even though the a new variety derived from a landrace by a plant 
breeder may not be opposed on the basis of the concept of essential derivation, it would still 
have to satisfy the normal DUS criteria. It should be noted that, according to UPOV 1991 the 
D here refers to distinctness from varieties of common knowledge and not just any existing 
material These criteria presuppose that the breeder has performed an intellectual activity with 
respect to the variety for which protection is sought. If the nature of the initial landrace is not 
taken into account and a decision on PBR protection is only based on DUS criteria, then indeed 
it could happen that it is protected, even though no meaningful intellectual activity has taken 
place. Pursuant to UPOV 1991, PBR protection may be applied for as long as the new variety 
is (I) commercially novel and (ii) is distinct from a variety of common knowledge. The key 
issues here are the definitions applied to commercial novelty (often very narrow) and varie-
ties of common knowledge. 
Farmers perspective 
The concept of essential derivation in PBR does not seem to be inconsistent with Farmer Seed 
Systems. In fact, essential derivation is central to such systems, allowing farmers to select ge-
netic materials (landraces) that are freely exchanged. Such selection in an, essentially common, 
gene pool leads to a broad spectrum of landraces similar in overall appearance but differing in 
gene frequencies for particular genetic expressions according to individual human and natural 
selection. The Indian PBR legislation has gone furthest in recognising the rights of farmers, by 
allowing registration of such landraces to provide some form of ownership protection, if they 
are used in commercial plant breeding. This legislation recognises the difficulty of assigning 
ownership of such landraces to individual farmers or communities. When registered materials 
are used for commercial purposes, compensation will be paid into a general fund that is used 
for supporting farmer activities in conservation. This mechanism appears to provide some 
natural justice to farmers as a community. However, in our view, the implementation of such a 
system will require extensive testing and documentation. The cost of implementation may well 
exceed the financial benefits that may accrue from the use of such materials by commercial 
plant breeding. 
There is a certain apparent inequity in UPOV-harmonised PBR legislation. Essential derivation 
in PBR only applies to other varieties that are already protected by PBR. Hence essential deri-
vation does not apply to landraces used by farmers, unless, as is provided for in the Indian leg-
islation, these are registered in some form. The question is who has to prove, and on what ba-
sis, that the new variety does not differ in essential characteristics from the original landrace. It 
will not be difficult to satisfy the level of uniformity and stability through selection that is re-
quired for PBR protection. Moreover, few farmers in Farmer Seed Systems will feel prejudiced 
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and instead may happily adopt the new variety if it provides improved performance under their 
circumstances, and the right to subsequently save and exchange seeds for their own non-
commercial practices is upheld. If, as is often the case, the new variety is introduced in other 
regions, most farmers will be even less concerned. 
This imbalance could be regarded in another way. All rules and legislation seem to be directed 
at imposing conditions of commercial plant breeding and modern agriculture on Farmer Seed 
Systems. An alternative approach in countries where Farmer Seed Systems are still the major 
source of seeds would be, to adapt legislation to the requirements of on-farm seed production, 
including situations where such varieties contain IPR-protected transgenic traits. If such trans-
genic characteristics provide an important contribution to farmers and national food security 
compulsory licensing, financed at the national governmental level, could provide both a solu-
tion and fair compensation to the originator(s) of such improvement(s). 
Scenario 5: Compulsory licensing 
Scenario 5 concerns the possibility of compulsory licensing of genetic material that has been 
developed by a breeder and that is considered beneficial for farmers participating in a Farmer 
Seed System. This raises the questions whether access to this genetic material can be enforced 
through compulsory licensing and whether compulsory licensing will guarantee fair compensa-
tion to the holder of the IPR. 
Legal perspective 
In general, the provisions regulating both patents and PBRs commonly provide for the possi-
bility of compulsory licensing. In applicable conventional international law, both Article 31 of 
the TRIPS Agreement and Article 17 of UPOV (1991) also provide for the possibility of com-
pulsory licensing. 
National legislation relating to both patents and PBRs also commonly provides for the possibil-
ity of compulsory licensing. The IPR Code of the Philippines provides for two ways of limiting 
patents in the public interest. The first is the use of an invention made by Government. Section 
74.1 permits a Government agency, or third person authorised by the Government, to exploit 
the invention even without agreement of the patent owner under specified circumstances. This 
is possible when: (a) the public interest, in particular national security, nutrition, health or the 
development of other sectors, as determined by the appropriate agency of the government, so 
requires; or (b) a judicial or administrative body has determined that the manner of exploita-
tion, by the owner of the patent or his licensee, is anti-competitive. 
The second way of limiting a patent in the public interest is through compulsory licensing. Ti-
tle II, Chapter X, of the IPR Code, contains elaborate provisions in this respect. Section 93 
provides that the Director of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office may grant a li-
cense to exploit a patented invention, even without the agreement of the patent owner, in fa-
vour of any person who has shown his capability to exploit the invention. This can be done 
under any of the following circumstances: 
i. a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency (subsection 93.1); 
requirements of the public interest, in particular, national security, nutrition, health or the 
development of other vital sectors of the national economy as determined by the appropri-
ate agency of the Government (subsection 93.2); 
ii. following a ruling by judicial or administrative body that the manner of exploitation by 
the owner of the patent or his licensee is anti-competitive (subsection 93.3); 
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iii. public non-commercial use of the patent by the patentee without satisfactory reason Sub-
section 93.4. or; 
iv. failure to implement the patent on a commercial scale in the Philippines without a satis-
factory reason, if the invention is capable of being implemented, provided, that the impor-
tation of the patented article will constitute working or using the patent (Subsection 93.5). 
The subsequent sections, Sections 94-102 contain further terms and conditions with respect to 
compulsory licenses. 
Similarly, with regard to patents, Title I, Chapter VIII, Section III, of Brazils Lei 9.279 con-
tains elaborate provisions relating to compulsory licensing. Article 68 provides that compul-
sory licensing is possible in the case of abusive exercise of rights or abuse of economic power. 
§ 1, attached to Article 68, provides further that a compulsory license may be granted in the 
case (i) of non-exploitation of the patent because of non-production or incomplete production 
of the product, or (ii) if commercialisation does not satisfy the necessities of the market. 
As an example of national legislation relating to PBRs, reference may be made to Lei N° 
9.456, of Brazil, which incorporates two possibilities for restricting a PBR. The first possibility 
for restricting a PBR is compulsory licensing. Article 28 provides that a protected variety may 
be the object of a compulsory licence that ensures: 
(i) the availability of the variety on the market, at reasonable prices, if the maintenance of 
regular supply is being unjustifiably impeded by the holder of the PBR; 
(ii) the regular distribution of the variety and the maintenance of its quality, and; 
(iii) reasonable remuneration to the holder of the PBR. 
The second possibility for restricting a PBR is the concept of restricted public use. According 
to Article 36, a protected variety may be declared of restricted public use, in the exclusive pub-
lic interest, to meet the necessities of agricultural policy, in cases of national emergency, abuse 
of economic power, or other circumstances of extreme urgency and in cases of non-commercial 
public use. 
Uganda is currently drafting a Plant Variety Protection Bill, which, in Article 18.1, provides for 
the possibility of compulsory licensing. In the case of compulsory licensing, pursuant to Article 
18.2 of the draft bill, the government may award appropriate and reasonable compensation to 
the holder of the IPR. Only in Nicaragua does the national legislation (Ley 318) appear not to 
make provisions for the possibilities of limiting IPRs in particular cases or, of compulsory li-
censing. 
Thus in general the principle of compulsory licensing is recognised in applicable conventional 
international law and national legislation. Two points must be noted, however. The first is that 
the facility of compulsory licensing is difficult to reconcile with the idea of intellectual prop-
erty, which presupposes that the grant of an exclusive right with respect to an intellectual activ-
ity which will, through the operation of the market also be beneficial, to society as a whole. 
Resort to the facility of compulsory licensing undermines this assumption. The second point is 
that the facility of compulsory licensing entails additional problems, including the problem of 
determining what constitutes appropriate remuneration for the holder of the patent. 
Farmers perspective 
The legal options for compulsory licensing have been reviewed above. Private industry is 
largely opposed to compulsory licensing, for obvious reasons. It reduces their exclusive control 
and market position. The pharmaceutical industry successfully resisted compulsory licensing 
of medicines and was supported in this by patent-issuing authorities. When challenged through 
international action over HIV medicines, elaborate conditions were set that limited the extent 
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of compulsory licensing. It is curious that patent-issuing authorities tend to be primarily con-
cerned with interpreting patent law in a manner that gives maximum protection to the patent 
holder, rather than viewing patents as a temporary right given by society to a patent holder. 
Equally, they appear to pay insufficient attention to the need to balance rights in the general 
interest. Even though patent rights are a contract between society and the inventor, patent-
issuing authorities appear increasingly to neglect their primary responsibility to represent the 
interests of society. The interpretation of patent law per se has come to take precedence over 
questions of societal purpose or social consequences.  
 
Compulsory licensing would seem to be an effective instrument for broadening access to 
knowledge and technology in the interests of society, while providing patent holders with rea-
sonable means to recover their investments in research. A de facto and temporary form of 
compulsory licensing has been agreed upon between Monsanto and the farm sector of Brazils 




Brazil Soy Trade to Pay Monsanto Royalties 
The farm sector in Brazils Rio do Sul state in Brazil has agreed to pay royalties to Monsanto for use of the 
companys GM Roundup Ready soybean variety smuggled into Brazil from neighbouring countries. Under 
the agreement buyers of transgenic soy beans, such as the crushing industry, co-operatives and exporters, 
will collect the charge and pay it back to Monsanto. This agreement is valid for one season only and it is 
not certain whether it will be extended. 
http://www.agbios.com/main.php?action=ShowNewsItem&id=5211 
 
The collection of royalties negotiated centrally between the farm sector and the patent holder 
at the point of delivery of harvested products is essentially a variant on compulsory licensing, 
i.e. open access at a reasonable price. The reason why this agreement in Rio do Sul is valid for 
one season only is obvious. The payment fully satisfies the principle of patent legislation in 
allowing the originator to recover costs of investment on his invention. The question, however, 
is whether Monsanto will agree to this as a permanent arrangement. So far the biotechnology 
industry has strongly resisted the option of compulsory licensing, as it limits their control over 





Corporate fights for market control through patents 
Bayer, Monsanto end IP war 
On October 14 [2003] an agreement was reached between Bayer Crop Science AG and Monsanto to cre-
ate reciprocal IPR licensing agreements. In doing so the companies ended many, but not all, law suits be-
tween them. Both companies were granted licenses for techniques related to the development of herbi-
cide-resistant crops. In addition Bayer dropped its IPR claims against YieldGard, a Bt corn developed by 
Monsanto, and marked down Monsantos existing license for technologies needed to create crops with 
more than one Bt toxin. The article reports that Monsanto eased the terms of Bayers license for gly-
phosate - tolerant Bt cotton. The piece notes that this agreement gives the two multinationals access to a 
wider range of technologies than their competitors. The article notes that in April 2002 Monsanto struck a 
similar agreement with Dupont. In a related story (Yahoo News, Nov.30, 2003) Bayer AG, parent company 
of Bayer Crop Science AG won the longest running battle in the history of plant biotechnology when its 
exclusive license to a technology based on plant-parasite interactions was upheld. The [public financed] 
Max Plank Society holds the patent for the technology, and, in late November (2003), the US Patent Office 
found that a similar Monsanto technology interfered with the institutes patent. According to a Bayer 
spokesman, the technology will now become the dominant patent in relation to the production of trans-
genic plants. 
SRC: Nature Biotechnology - ATH: Peter Vermij; 
Ref. fs-afbiotech@list.merid.org of 6.12.2003 
  International agreements, national law and farmer seed systems 63
While patenting was originally designed for the purpose of recovering costs of research, in bio-
technology it now has become a major factor in achieving market control of products of inno-
vation in a way which exceeds the original objectives of IPR protection. (See Box 5-7).  
 
This problem is exacerbated by the fragmentation of IP-protected enabling technologies. A 
prominent example of the complexity resulting from such fragmentation is Golden Rice 
(high pro-vitamin A) in which at least 40 (some reports claim up to 70) patents and contractual 
obligations are involved. This presented significant constraints for development by researchers 




The dilemma of nutritionally enriched GM crops. 
Biotechnology offers options to enrich major food crops with essential nutrients. A prime example is the 
high vitamin-A Golden Rice. It was developed by Dr. Ingo Potrykus of the Swiss Federal Institute of tech-
nology and Dr. Peter Beyer of the University of Freiburg in Germany with major financial support from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science, and the European Commu-
nity Biotech Programme. 
The rights on the technology, developed by public institutions were licensed to the Syngenta Corporation 
for further development and seed production. The reason was that the institutes lacked the capacity to ex-
ploit this technology for use, as it required access to at least 40 separate IPR protected inventions held by 
different patent holders. Syngenta, after succeeding in solving the complex ownership rights, in fairness, 
released the technology free of charge to interested parties on specific conditions - free use by farmers in 
developing countries with a GDP of less than US$ 10.000 per capita and royalty payments by all other us-
ers. It was highly publicised in a campaign to promote acceptance of GM crops for the general good and, 
as some critics maintain, primarily to polish the reputation of the biotechnology industry. 
Jaap Hardon 
 
This illustrates that, as a result of IPRs, biotechnology research and development has become 
by necessity dominated by international corporations. Only very large corporations can assem-
ble the sizeable sets of patents needed for product development and have the power to negoti-
ate access to other required patents. Such corporations, as was earlier indicated, have little in-
centive to address problems of small farmers and food security. Public institutions are tradi-
tionally responsible for that sector, but in the field of biotechnology they require access to the 
technology: which today has to be negotiated and paid for through IPRs and mutual licensing 
agreements that are largely in the hands of large multinational corporations.  
The question of access in the interest of society and farmers needs to be addressed in the con-
text of WIPO. However, legitimate action on protecting traditional knowledge and genetic re-
sources (Box 5-9) has been delayed, because countries in the International Government Com-
mittee and the General Council of WIPO cannot agree on how to tackle these issues. 
Block 5-9 
 
WIPO action on traditional knowledge and genetic resources 
SRC; the Lancet - ATH: Clare Kapp 
WIPO has agreed to intensify efforts to protect traditional knowledge and genetic resources but has 
stopped short of committing to a full international treaty. During its recent meeting (Sept. 22 - Oct.1, 2003) 
WIPOs General Assembly authorised the possible development of an international instrument(s). 
According to the article, the agreement came after a divisive debate among WIPO member states. Brazil, 
Venezuela and some African states advocated an international treaty in the next two years, while 
industrialised countries wanted a more gradual approach. A compromise decision was reached, and WIPO 
officials hope that there will be some form of international agreed action on traditional knowledge and ge-
netic resources in the next three or four years. 
http/:www.scidev.net/news/index.cfm?fuseaction=readnews&itemid=1049&language=1 
 
  Biotechnology, Patents and Farmer Seed Systems 64
The reluctance to commit themselves to initiatives aimed at protecting traditional knowledge 
and genetic resources is symptomatic of the whole IPR-issuing bureaucracy in industrial coun-
tries. They see themselves as merely interpreters of existing IPR legislation rather than as re-
sponsible for balancing ownership rights with the general interests of society. In this respect a 




Push to Free Up Biotech Tools for all 
The Centre for the Application of Molecular Biology to International Agriculture (GAMBIA), an Australian 
non-profit organisation, is urging the global biotechnology community to support a new programme for 
open access to the scientific tools of modern biology and genetics. The new programme, called Biologi-
cal Innovation for Open Society (BIOS) was announced in January 2004 to the World Economic Forum in 
Switzerland. The founding director of GAMBIA, Richard Jefferson stated that the tools of biotechnology, 
through exclusive IP protection, were withheld from potential innovators, stifling competition, fair play and 
creativity, as well as leading to legitimate unease by the public about biotech. He argues that one can 




In the present economic and political climate a satisfactory solution is obviously a long way 
off. In the meantime, the existing ambiguous state of affairs, leads to the main beneficiaries of 
plant biotechnology being not farmers, but shareholders and the legal profession protecting 
those interests. 
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6 Implications and conclusions 
6.1 Implications of IPR Protection 
The problems encountered when GM varieties containing IPR-protected transgenic characters 
are introduced into Farmer Seed Systems are complex. The analysis of these problems has 
been placed in the wider context of agricultural practices in modern and traditional agriculture 
and in the context of various international agreements and national and international law per-
taining to conservation, access and use of plant genetic resources. 
An important conclusion is that international agreements are, through necessity, flexible and 
therefore may lack clarity and consistency, particularly when there are overlapping issues. This 
gives rise to problems that are, in part, caused by the nature of the various negotiation proc-
esses, typically carried out by different national representatives of different ministries and in 
pursuit of different objectives. The finalisation of such negotiations is generally the 
responsibility of policy makers, who seek compromise and often lack sufficient knowledge and 
understanding of biological processes, agriculture and the needs of farmers. In the flexible 
nature of international agreements, conflicting issues are often referred back to national 
legislation for interpretation and implementation in the expectation that this provision will 
cover possible inconsistencies and ambiguities. 
The issues have been dealt with in this document in a critical fashion in order to highlight the 
problems. However this should not be interpreted as questioning the overall importance of 
such international agreements. The CBD and the FAO Treaty in particular have highlighted the 
importance of biological diversity and the shared international responsibility to safeguard these 
resources for future generations. They oblige national governments to take actions that other-
wise might not have been taken. 
This document applies the same approach to biotechnology. We do not question the potential 
importance of biotechnology in itself in increasing the options for improving crops and con-
tributing to food security. Our analysis of factors that affect the use of and access to biotech-
nology accepts these assumptions. Our main concern is that applying common IPR protection 
to contributions made by biotechnology in a one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate in two 
respects. First, it is inappropriate in an economic sense for countries at different stages of tech-
nological development. Secondly, as we illustrate and argue, in our view convincingly, that 
exclusive legal ownership of transgenes in crop varieties does not make biological sense, since 
their spread cannot be controlled once seed is sold to farmers. 
Our main concern is with small (subsistence) farmers and the Farmer Seed Systems that hey 
rely on as their main source of planting material. The number of such farmers is still huge, but 
as economic development progresses it will decline. In tandem, Farmer Seed Systems will 
gradually be replaced by institutional and commercial plant breeding and seed production. 
Again, we do not question these developments. However, they will take much time. We argue 
that, in the mean time, access to technologies needs to be structured so that it does not dis-
criminate against small farmers. In a more general vein, it should provide an equitable balance 
between the interests of farmers and corporate interests. 
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Implications for Farmer Seed Systems 
Our attention centres on countries where Farmer Seed Systems are the main source of planting 
materials. The results of our analysis suggest that in such countries a standard application of 
IPR protection regardless of the content matter may not be appropriate. IPR rights are time-
limited rights granted by society to an inventor and are required to consider the interests of so-
ciety as well as those of inventors and corporations. At present IPR rights appear to primarily 
protect the interests of the latter group. 
Crop improvement is an evolutionary process and enabling technologies need to be made 
available for application to numerous crops in a wide diversity of environments. It is only un-
der such conditions that biotechnologys potential to benefit farmers and contribute to world 
food security will be realised. It will not be achieved through restrictive access and near-
monopoly control of biotechnology by a relatively few corporations and individuals. 
In our analysis, IPR protection applied to planting materials (varieties of crops) has been 
shown to conflict with fundamental aspects of Farmer Seed Systems and to be difficult to en-
force. In developing countries, Farmer Seed Systems are the main source of seeds for farmers, 
and frequently the source of 80% or more of the total national seed requirement. It seems pecu-
liar that under such circumstances it is Farmer Seed Systems that are having to accommodate 
to conditions set by the still minority interest of a commercial sector. This accommodation 
nevertheless has been written into international agreements and national legislation, compro-
mising the rights of farmers to produce their own seed, and assigning proprietary rights to their 
materials (Farmers Rights) as a mirror image of IPR legislation. We conclude that proprietary 
rights are incompatible with the cultural cosmo-vision and practices of small farmers. We sug-
gest that the concept and application of Farmers Rights should incorporate, as its main princi-
ple, the freedom of farmers and farming communities to continue to operate within the context 
of their own cultural and agricultural livelihood systems. This implies the right to maintain the 
integrity of Farmer Seed Systems. 
Implications for national seed industry development 
Through WTO/TRIPS developing countries are obliged to enact at least effective sui generis 
IPR legislation in the form of PBR. The argument, that such legislation would at least stimulate 
breeding by private industry and wider access to improved varieties and thus benefit develop-
ing countries, is questionable (Fugli et al, 2003). The seed industry is an essential component 
of national agriculture. The development of national seed production capacity is important for 
the long-term security of seed supply to its farmers. Over-dependence on foreign companies 
prior to establishing a national seed industry carries considerable risks. In the absence of mean-
ingful competition, foreign companies will easily achieve a dominant position in the more 
commercially attractive crops, taking over small local companies in the process. This will 
make control of national seed supply of major crops dependent on foreign corporate decisions 
and leave only the less economically attractive markets and crops open to national companies, 
which will significantly reduce their economic prospects. Governments will have to decide 
whether this is in the long-term interest of their farming sector. 
Pray and Fugli, (2002), in a survey of seven Asian countries, argue that PBR may indeed in-
crease private incentives to invest in agricultural research, so long as countries allow the pri-
vate sector to compete in agricultural input markets, establish a productive public research sys-
tem, and maintain good legal institutions. Few developing countries fully satisfy these re-
quirements. Hence, while in industrial countries IPR in agriculture evolved slowly, in tandem 
with developments in other sectors and in institutional capacity, many developing countries 
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are, through WTO/TRIPS and trade pressures required to adopt IPR systems that bear no or 
little relation to their situation and needs. This often occurs at considerable cost. 
WTO/TRIPS, WIPO and the policies of industrial countries should reflect the fundamental so-
cial purpose of patent systems, to serve the interests of society in both invention and access to 
technology and consider the diversity between countries in how best this can be achieved. 
Hence one-sided trade pressures aimed at limiting the flexibility, permitted under the 
WTO/TRIPS agreement, should be opposed, to ensure that patent systems can be tailored to 
local and national needs. Patent systems in developing countries should consider more than 
just the requirements of commercial crop improvement and seed production. They should also 
take account of Farmer Seed Systems and the important and essential role that they play in the 
agriculture of most developing countries. The social and legal consequences of ignoring this 
role conflicts with the interests of society. 
Implications for research and development 
The biotechnology industry argues that without strong and harmonised patent protection it will 
not be able to justify the presently huge investments in this technology. This argument deserves 
scrutiny. Strong and exclusive patent protection is not an inherent right. Such a right needs to 
be carefully balanced by clear benefits to the society that issues such rights. If someone makes 
a significant contribution he or she should obviously be allowed to gain some financial benefit 
from it. However, such benefits should not lead to monopolies that impair overall progress in 
research. Neither should these rights conflict with the basic human needs of food security and 
livelihood, especially those of poor people. In agricultural research these are important consid-
erations. 
The limited use of developments in biotechnology to address poor peoples crops has much to 
do with the structural concentration of plant breeding and associated biotechnology in the 
hands of a few large international corporations. This concentration, at least in part, has been 
brought about by the possibility of obtaining standard and exclusive patent protection. The 
concentration of such patents, notably for enabling technologies, complicates the role of public 
institutions in addressing problems associated with less profitable markets. While the research 
can be done, bringing the results to the field often requires access to a large number of patents. 
This demands complex and costly negotiations with uncertain outcomes. The inter-dependence 
between different patented technologies required to realise a final product (variety) is inherent 
to crop improvement but may restrict the development or application of crops that are of gen-
eral benefit to society. 
There is no doubt that private industry has become the major holder of patents in biotechnol-
ogy. As reported by Atkinson et al (2003) private industry accounts for an estimated 76% of the 
patents, while universities and other public institutions are so far responsible for only 24%. 
However the latter figure includes many of the types of technologies that are necessary in order 
to conduct basic agricultural research and develop new GM plant varieties. Public institutions 
have made important contributions to technologies to transfer genes into plant cells, a tech-
nique to characterise specific DNA elements that drive unique patterns of gene expression, and 
have identified many genes that confer important plant traits. The problem is that ownership of 
these technologies is highly fragmented and IPRs developed by publicly financed institutions 
often are licensed on restrictive terms to private industry thereby limiting public use. This is 
especially harmful to many developing countries where plant breeding is mainly carried out by 
government institutes that lack the resources to negotiate access to such potentially useful 
technologies. 
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The current emphasis of biotechnology research on primarily labour-saving and product qual-
ity traits that are of interest to the food industry is clearly illustrated by a Review of GMOs 
under Research and Development and in the Pipeline in Europe of the EU Joint Research 
Centre (2003, box 6-1). 
Box 6-1 
 
Pipeline GM products 
For the next 5 years 
Herbicide tolerant maize, oilseed rape, soybeans, wheat, sugar beet, fodder beet, cotton and chicory 
Insect-resistant maize, cotton and potatoes 
Modified starch and fatty acid content in potatoes, soybean and oilseed rape 
Modified colour/form in flowers 
Modified fruit ripening in tomatoes 
Both herbicide tolerant and insect-resistant traits in maize and cotton 
 
For the next 5 to 10 years 
Fungi-resistant wheat, oilseed rape, sunflower and fruit trees 
Virus-resistant sugar beet, potato, tomato, melon and fruit trees 
Herbicide-tolerant wheat, barley and rice 
Modified fatty acid content in soybeans and oilseed rape 
Modified protein content in oilseed rape, maize and potatoes 
High erucic acid content in oilseed rape 
 
Research on production constraints of particular importance to developing countries; tolerance 
to a-biotic stresses such as drought and salinity or generally increasing genetic yield potential, 
is rare and is mainly carried out by often poorly funded public, or not-for-profit, institutions. 
Even if such research leads to significant new options, the development of such research into 
meaningful products, such as new and improved GM varieties for a great diversity of environ-
mental conditions, requires ready access to the technologies involved. As in Golden Rice 
(Atkinson et al 2003), such access should not be based on the voluntary willingness of patent 
holders to allow use of the technologies involved, but should be facilitated in a fair manner that 
gives adequate credit to the originators. Developments in agriculture and food security should 
not depend on charity. 
These problems are not solely limited to developing countries. In industrial countries universi-
ties and agricultural research institutes are increasingly forced to financially exploit their re-
search, including through patenting and licensing. This further constrains the application of 
biotechnology for humanitarian purposes or for the improvement of minor and/or subsistence 
crops for developing countries. Noting this problem, a number of universities in the US have 
launched a Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management (PIPRA) initiative. 
This initiative is seeking better access to IPR protected technologies in the general interest 
(Atkinson et al, 2003). A group of 59 scientists, including several Nobel prize winners and 
economists, have written to the director-general of WIPO, drawing attention to the fact that 
excessive and unbalanced or poorly designed intellectual property protection may be coun-
terproductive to the development of science and the interests of society (Nature 10.7.2003). 
They request WIPO to address the issues in a major conference. In effect they are asking for 
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 Problems are not caused just by fragmented IPRs of enabling technologies. The transfer 
and expression of new gene complexes into the genomes of plants have uncertain outcomes 
and possible side effects that may require extensive research. A recent example is provided 
by attempts by Kenyas KARI Biotechnology Centre to transfer virus resistance into sweet 
potato (Box 6.2). 
Box 6.2 
 
Imported GM technology fails in sweet potatoes 
A gene construct developed by Monsanto coding for a coat protein responsible for virus resistance was 
donated to Kenyas KARI biotechnology centre for incorporation in sweet potatoes. This programme was 
much publicised as an example of private-public co-operation. The US special envoy, Dr Andrew Young, 
attended its launch in 2001 and stated that with biotechnology, we are going to make a green revolution in 
Africa. However 3 years later, it appears in field tests that the gene construct had failed to produce virus 
resistance, either by inadequate expression or because it did not address the diversity of virus strains in 
Kenya. In fact the GM strains yielded considerably less than the non-GM controls. According to the article, 
the study offered new evidence against claims of the miracle potential of biotechnology for dealing with 
famine and poverty in Africa. KARI will continue its research, now based on local strains of the virus. 
http:www.agbios.com/main.php?action=ShoeNewsItem&id=5211 
 
This should not be interpreted as a critique of biotechnology per se. The example illustrates 
that nature is more robust than biotechnologists- or at least biotech companies - seem to give it 
credit for. There are no easy solutions. It points to the need for an extensive, lengthy and costly 
research effort to explore and exploit the exciting new options that biotechnology provides. 
Gene constructs are no silver bullets. Their expression in foreign genomes is always uncertain 
and requires research and access to technologies, both in the public and private sector in a 
manner that benefits the common good. 
Implications for agriculture and food production 
Strong IPR protection of both GM products and enabling GM technologies is both cause and 
effect of the dominant position of a limited number of large multinational corporations in bio-
technology. This has far reaching consequences. Private firms invest in agricultural in order 
to earn profits for their shareholders. Their profits depend, among other things, on the size of 
the potential market for their inventions. To earn return on investments, such large corpora-
tions tend to concentrate on products with potential billion dollar markets. Firms are unlikely 
to invest very much money on research to improve crops for which the market is small and the 
potential payoff is low (Pray and Naseem 2003). The results achieved by biotechnology over 
twenty years and with substantial investments support this statement. What do we see in farm-
ers fields? In 2003 GM varieties covered around 58 million hectares, but were mainly re-
stricted to 4 crops: soya (61%), corn (23%), cotton (11%) and canola (5%) (ISAAA 2003 - 
http://www.isaaa.org). The range of introduced new characteristics is also modest. They are so 
far restricted to herbicide tolerance (73%), Bt. insect resistance (18%), a combination of both 
(9%) (ISAAA 2003). When one looks at how these technologies have been developed and are 
used by private industry and what the benefits to agriculture have been to date, the results are 
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Figure 2: Distribution of total GM crop area over crops in percentages 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of total GM crop area over traits in percentages 
The development of herbicide tolerance is a case in point. There is no doubt that control of 
weeds is a major problem in agriculture. This creates a huge potential for using IPRs to capture 
an enormous market for both the chemical weed control agent and its tolerant varieties. This 
example also highlights a number of problems. 
The industry claims that genetic approaches to weed problems can lead to a reduction in the 
use of chemical herbicides, both in total amount of herbicides applied and in the frequency of 
spraying. In addition they can facilitate no-till practices, reducing the threat of soil erosion on 
fragile soils, which is especially important in high or intense rain-fall areas. These are real 
benefits. However, there are also potential risks. Many agronomists have warned that use of a 
single herbicide, for which varieties are made tolerant, may lead to shifts in the composition of 
weed complexes and over time may lead to the emergence of (relatively) more resistant weed 
species. The control of such weeds will either require increased application of the herbicide in 
question or additional spraying with other herbicides. The first signs of this in soya have been 
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Services (http://biotech-info.net/technicalpaper6.htm) similar resistance is emerging in a num-
ber of US states. These results are hotly challenged by industrial sources, which blame anti-
biotechnology activists and claim an absence of research evidence to support such observations 
(http://www.monsanto.co.uk/). Yet, the biotech industry has failed to provide any research evi-
dence to refute these claims. 
This shows that agriculture depends on complex interactions and that new technologies need to 
be tested in their context before wide spread adoption occurs. Dependence on single-bullet 
technology pushed by profit oriented multinational companies may carry great risks. It should 
be pointed out, that these developments take place at a time that agricultural research in general 
has moved away from addressing single production constraints, realising that sustainable agri-
cultural production requires more ecologically sensitive approaches that consider the total pro-
duction environment. 
In the context of agriculture and food security, this suggests the need for greater public re-
search and proper risk analysis to balance the dominant role of private industry. It shows the 
dangers inherent in the global trend towards the privatisation of such research. In biotechnol-
ogy such a balance requires, in part, appropriate forms of IPRs. IPRs should not lead to mo-
nopoly situations and the push for adoption of a technology for short-term profits should not 
take priority over the need to broadly test for long-term effects on the environment, agricultural 
production and food security. 
6.2 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Our major conclusion is that international agreements fail to give adequate recognition to 
Farmer Seed Systems as the major source of seeds in many developing countries. This failure, 
in our opinion, biases interpretation of international agreements. It also has a negative impact 
on national interests of agricultural, the development of national seed industries and on provid-
ing access to biotechnology and its benefits in the general interest of agriculture, food produc-
tion, that include benefits extended to small and resource poor farmers. 
We illustrate that trying to apply one-size-fits-all patent protection to biological (planting) ma-
terials in agriculture is inoperable, creates a legal quagmire and conflicts with the general in-
terests of society. While meant to stimulate innovation and its application, in this context it ac-
tually blocks progress and meaningful use except in capital-intensive industrial agricultural 
production. The result so far is an overall failure of biotechnology to address the real problems 
faced by agriculture to secure adequate food for a growing world population and alleviate rural 
poverty. IPRs may not be the only cause for this. However, we contend that IPRs at least play 
an important role. Their application to biological materials need to be re-considered. In our 
view, it requires new and effective sui generis forms of intellectual property protection that are 
grounded in agricultural practices, rather then just designed to serve industrial interests. 
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Conclusion on the Concepts of International Law 
1 Positions adopted with respect to IPRs (for example that the exchange of genetic material 
within a Farmer Seed System is incompatible with patents relating to genetic material or 
that, in the case of introgression, patents extend to the introgressed genetic material) are de-
pendent on an interpretation of the applicable conventional international law. Such interpre-
tations cannot be imposed coherently or unilaterally by one State on another State or by the 
holder of the patent on farmers participating in a Farmer Seed System. 
2 The question of consistency between different international agreements is inter-related with 
the question of the interpretation of the applicable agreements. Only if it is assumed that an 
agreement has a fixed meaning does the question of the inconsistency between different 
agreements arise. Current applicable conventional international law contains provisions that 
may be regarded as requiring the recognition of IPRs relating to genetic material (although 
this is dependent on the possibility of distinguishing between the concept of micro-
organism and the concept of genetic material). They also contain clauses which, albeit 
only tenuously, recognise, or bear relevance to Farmer Seed Systems. This leads to ambigu-
ous and inconclusive interpretations. 
3 Nevertheless, the construction of the international legal framework does seem to contain an 
element of bias in that IPRs are explicitly recognised as private rights, and are presented as 
full rights in themselves. In contrast, the recognition of the concept of farmers rights is pre-
sented in an incomplete and conditional manner and its enforcement or defence is the re-
sponsibility of national governments. 
4 Companies cannot rely directly on IPRs provided for in conventional international law. 
Conventional international law seeks to prescribe the conditions under which national legis-
lation must recognise and defend IPRs. As such, the existence and exercise of IPRs is always 
dependent on national legislation. 
5 Both the concepts of IPR and Farmer Seed Systems are based on the idea that the intellectual 
and physical work of a human being should not be subject to appropriation. The concept of 
IPR is based on the assumption that protection against such appropriation must be afforded 
in the form of an exclusive right. If it is considered that the protection of Farmer Seed Sys-
tems against intrusive effects of IPRs requires the creation of a protective right, such as a 
farmers right or a right to the protection of traditional knowledge, this implies that, in the 
absence of such rights, the intellectual and physical work embodied in a Farmer Seed Sys-
tem may be subject to such appropriation. This conclusion seems inconsistent with the basis 
on which the concept of IPR is constructed. 
6 Reconciling the equitable idea underlying the concept of IPR with the normative situation of 
Farmer Seed Systems requires a normative construction that relates IPRs on genetic material 
and Farmer Seed Systems to each other. This construction cannot permit exclusive and con-
tradictory presumptions to co-exist. 
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Recommendations on the functioning of Farmer Seed Systems 
1 IPRs on planting material, as defined by common patent law, should be re-considered in the 
light of the nature of biological materials whose spread, through natural means, cannot be 
contained. 
2 IPRs on planting material should consider, and be compatible with, the practices and cultural 
and socio-economic conditions that form the basis of traditional agriculture and Farmer Seed 
Systems. 
3 Farmers Rights, as defined in the FAO Treaty on Genetic Resources for Food and Agricul-
ture merely urge countries to provide ownership rights to local genetic resources that do not 
effectively provide benefits to farmers. In effect they provide rights that seem to conflict 
with the basic practices of Farmer Seed Systems. Such rights would seem to merely repre-
sent an attempt to justify appropriation of biological materials through IPRs. The basic right 
afforded to farmers should be the freedom to continue with the practices and cultural and 
socio-economic context of Farmer Seed Systems, while having access to all relevant tech-
nologies on appropriate and reasonable terms that do not depend upon charity. 
4 There is a need for greater scrutiny of the developmental effects of IPRs, particularly the 
linkages with poverty and food security, and adoption of sui generis legislation that is com-
patible with Farmer Seed Systems and promotes the development of national seed industries 
with access to relevant technologies. 
5 Proposals for reform of the TRIPs regime, currently under consideration, should preserve the 
rights of WTO members to tailor their IPR regimes according to their particular circum-
stances, which should pay particular regard to the special needs of poor farmers and to main-
taining the integrity of Farmer Seed Systems. Countries should not be subject to bilateral 
trade pressures in this area. 
6 Options for IPR legislation on crops that satisfy WTO/TRIPS requirements, should at least 
allow for effective compulsory licensing in order to facilitate broad access to biotechnology 
relevant for food and agriculture against a reasonable fee. 
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Appendix 1: Important Web Sites 
FAO Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA) 
http://web.icppgr.fao.org/home.htm 
This site provides access to issues relevant to the FAO Commission. 
GRAIN 
http://www.grain.org 
This site provides access to information on topics related to genetic resources, conservation, 
ownership national IPR legislation etc. The site is fully available in English, French and Span-
ish. 
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute: IPGRI 
http://www.cgiar.org/ipgri 
As a CGIAR centre, IPGRI has a mandate to advance the conservation and use of genetic di-
versity for the common good. Its site provides access to information on IPGRI itself (e.g. man-
date, vision, strategy, impact), issues on genetic resources (e.g. conservation, legal and policy 
matters), networks, events, training opportunities, country related programmes etc. 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants: UPOV 
http://www.upov.org 
This site contains all the relevant information relating to UPOV, including its role and func-
tions, the full text of the convention (Acts of 1961, 1978, 1991), National Plant Variety Protec-
tion Laws, membership, ratification situation, addresses, meetings, press releases, documents 
and publications. 
ETC, formerly Rural Advancement Foundation International: RAFI, 
http://www.ETC.org 
ETC is an international non-governmental organisation based in Canada. ETCs focus is on the 
conservation and sustainable improvement of agricultural biodiversity and socially responsible 
development of technologies useful to rural societies. RAFI organises campaigns and publishes 
thematic documentation. 
World Intellectual Property Organisation: WIPO 
http://www.wipo.org/eng/main.htm 
The site is accessible in English, French and Spanish and provides official information on all 
internationally agreed treaties related to intellectual property rights. The search engine gives 
access to discussions on the relationship between patenting and plant and animal life forms. 
World Trade Organisation: WTO 
http://www.wto.org/wto/intellec/intellec.htm 
This site provides information with regard to news, works of the TRIPS council, notifications, 
reviews of members implementation of legislation, technical co-operation and disputes. The 
special page for Community/Forums is intended to involve NGOs in TRIPS issues. A page 
with Frequently Asked Questions gives an introduction into some elementary TRIPS aspects. 
The site is accessible in English, French and Spanish via the home page. One then finds the 
way to TRIPS via trade topics. 
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Meridian Institute 
http://www.merid.org 
The Meridian institute facilitates debate on issues involving multiple points of view. Merid-
ians experience encompasses environment, natural resources, agriculture, sustainability, sci-
ence and technology and security. They work at the local, national and international level. 
Their mailing service provides up-to-date information on Food Security and agricultural bio-
technology news and it was an important source for many of the topical boxes contained in this 
book (http://www.merid.org/fs-agbiotech) 
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